The Two Faces of the Revolution: Dynamism, Toxicity, and Violence in Zimbabwe's Tongogara

Dr. Dylan Yanano Mangani

Community of Practice (COP) in Law & Governance and Security,
BRICS Research Institute, International Centre of Nonviolence (ICON),
Durban University of Technology
Corresponding email: DylanM1@dut.ac.za

Abstract

This article examines the leadership traits of one of Zimbabwe's most celebrated military figures, Josiah Magama Tongogara. More specifically, the article investigates Tongogara's leadership as a military and political figure within the broader revolutionary theoretical framework that legitimises violence and asymmetrical tactics for attaining broader political revolutionary objectives. Within the public domain, Tongogara remains a towering military figure beyond reproach. Yet compellingly, different views locate his instrumentalisation of asymmetrical methods to manipulate internal party processes and violence to manage his political and military opponents within the framework of toxicity in leadership. Liberation struggles became the locomotive through which systemic shifts in African political, socio-economic and identity oppression were realised. These contradictions form the basis of the 'two faces of the revolution', illuminating the darker aspects of Tongogara's leadership while celebrating him as one of the most influential nationalist figures in Zimbabwe's history. Rising from the above concerns, this article utilises a qualitative secondary research approach that interrogates ZANU's 1973 Review Conference, the 1974 Nhari-Badza 'rebellion and Tongogara's fractured relations with Herbert Chitepo to add to long-standing arguments about Tongogara's controversial leadership through toxic leadership lenses. The article demonstrates that Tongogara's use

of asymmetrical means, such as political identity manufacturing, naming, creating binaries between those regarded as more militant than others, and instrumental use of violence to settle disputes, are key drivers of toxicity in leadership.

Keywords: *Discipline, Leadership, Tongogara, Toxicity, ZANLA, ZANU.*

Introduction

Liberation struggles became the locomotive through which systemic shifts in African political, socio-economic, and identity oppression were realised. Ostensibly, the Zimbabwean struggle for independence waged by the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) and its competitor, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), offered African people respite from colonialism's separate development. However, as many scholars have demonstrated, the inherent contradictions within the struggle presented challenges emanating from elitist hegemonic politics within a political hierarchy. New interpretations of leadership have emerged in business management, psychology, and political science. Some scholars have broadened this discussion with a focus on toxicity in leadership. The concept originates from various scholars, such as Goldman (2006), Kellerman (2004), and Glad (2002), who examined the darker side of leadership. Until recently, the standard approach to leadership was that 'if it [leadership] is unethical or immoral, it is not leadership' (Burns, 2004:48). This was a minimalist approach to understanding leadership that tended to neglect controversial yet prominent personalities in history. This exclusionary approach has punctuated studies on nationalist leadership in Zimbabwe. Nationalist studies seek to glorify leadership in ZAPU and ZANU yet deliberately ignore some of the inadequacies of prominent leaders. The example of Josiah Tongogara, the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of ZANU, is a classic example. Utilising ZANU's 1973 Review Conference, the 1974 Nhari-Badza 'rebellion and Tongogara's fractured relations with Herbert Chitepo, this paper adds to long-standing arguments about Tongogara's controversial leadership through toxic leadership lenses. Utilising a qualitative desktop methodology, this study discusses Tongogara's toxic leadership within the broader framework of revolutionary theory. Here, the subject is

'violence' as the standard barometer for authenticating revolutions and legitimising revolutionary leaders.

An Appraisal of Revolutionary Theory and the Zimbabwean Experience

Extensive scholarship has covered the form and content of armed revolutions (Stone 2013; Lawson 2005 and Mao 1954). Some of the contradictions inherently depicted as the 'two faces of the revolution' have emerged from this scholarship. Consequently, Dunn, quoted in Lawson (2005: 1) argues that:

> Revolutions, like the temple of Janus, have two faces. One is an elegant, abstract and humanitarian face, an idyllic face, the dream of revolution and its meaning under the calm distancing of eternity. The other is crude, violent and very concrete, rather nightmarish, with all the hypnotic power, loss of perspective, and breath of the understanding you might expect to go with nightmares.

On the surface, revolutions have altruistic motives, yet revolutions are also depicted as self-serving and narrow political projects whose potential has undesirable outcomes. History is pregnant with examples of contradictions inherent in revolutions, such as the French Revolution of 1789. The French Revolution epitomised egalitarian principles such as *equality*, *fraternity*, and *liberty*. Ostensibly, this period offered relief to French citizens from the excesses of monarchy and the privileged nobility. The French Revolution became the epitome of social change of the 18th century. Yet, with hindsight, the French Revolution also led to the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte's dictatorship, which curtailed the gains made under the French Revolution (Kates 2006). A revolution is a process by which a society and its socioeconomic and political structures are radically changed. Huntington (2006:264) says,

> A revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership and government activity and policies.

It is instructive to note that 'violence' is critical in transformative political processes. Noteworthy is the concept of 'processes' and 'violence' as essential variables that interrogate the intricacies of the period under

study. Some scholars have theorised revolutions as African nationalism construction tools and, in doing so, legitimised violence in the form of armed struggles as a means towards political and socio-economic emancipation (Cabral 1972; Johnson 1982). Amilcar Cabral was a towering Guinea-Bissau theoretician and revolutionary who emphasised waging national armed struggles *as a rite de passage* for altering the political and socio-economic systems set by colonialism. Subsequently, Halliday and Halliday (1999) depict revolutions not as mistakes but as momentous in dispensing modernity. To Mao Zedong, the Chinese communist leader, violence is the barometer used to make distinctions between genuine and negotiated political projects. Tellingly, Mao, cited in (Lawson 2005:51), says:

> A revolution is not the same as inviting people to dinner, writing an essay, or painting a picture…it cannot be anything so refined, so calm and gentle. A revolution is an uprising, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another.

Commonalities are found with the Marxist theory, which postulates that revolutions are locomotives that provide the necessary step from feudalism to capitalism and socialism. Moran and Salzani (2015: 233) cite Karl Marx, who said, 'Violence is the midwife of every old society that is pregnant with the new'. Drawing from Marxist scholarship, the article seeks to unpack thematic issues underpinning a militarist violence dimension. Marxist scholarship should be helpful and be premised against ZANU's 'clarion call to war' at its inaugural congress in 1964. Earlier in 1962, the leader of ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo, indicated to the Soviets that 'ZAPU needs arms, explosives, revolvers, etc... The party also needs money to bribe the persons who guard important installations to carry out sabotage' (Shubin, 2008:153). This broadened the conception of Zimbabwe's struggle for independence based on an armed revolutionary approach.

The entry point to the use of violence is well captured in *The Catechism of a Revolutionary* by Sergie Gennadievich Nechayev (Bakunin, 2020). A repressive Russian political climate influenced Nechayev's political thought in 1869, resulting from the unabated power of the Czar and the Church. In his arguments, violence became altruistic in upsetting the political status quo. Second, Nechayev locates a revolutionary as a by-product of the nexus between the revolution's goals and the

consequential material conditions of the time. The argument is that a revolutionary conforms to the revolution's dictates, which disavows individual piety and public opinion and prescribes social morality in pursuit of the 'preferred reality' dictated by the revolution. Since the revolutionary is a personification of the revolution, he is above criticism in defining what is moral. Consequently, morality is anything that advances a revolution's objectives while simultaneously criminalising anything that stands in attaining the revolution's objectives. This depicts fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is the archetypal black-and-white approach that excludes other opinions (Mangani, 2019). A sense of toxicity in revolutions underscores the above description. This toxicity can be seen in asymmetrical methods such as political assassinations, political violence, political arrests, and imprisonments that emerged as common among revolutionaries in recorded history. With this in mind, this article locates the discussion on one of Zimbabwe's most celebrated military figures and revolutionary, Josiah Tongogara, within the confines of revolutionary theories, violence, toxicity, and the consequential material conditions of the time under investigation. Though Tongogara is depicted as a revolutionary par excellence, a towering nationalist like his contemporaries in African anti-colonial histories, his conceptualisation of the form and content of the struggle creates a gap in scholarship that this article seeks to confront.

Two faces of the revolution: Contradicting narratives of Tongogara

The subsection tries to understand Tongogara's military leadership using Lipman-Blueman's toxicity model in leadership. Lipman-Blueman (2005a: 19-20) argues that many highly esteemed leaders in the business and political world often possess what she sees as toxicity. Toxicity may range from exhibiting traits that are dangerous, such as manipulating the internal processes of an organisation or party, disliking constructive criticism, and using violence to manage dissenting voices. Heppell (2011:243) argues that toxic leaders are those whose leadership generates a serious and enduring negative, even poisonous, effect on individuals, families, organisations, and communities exposed to their methods. The article borrows from these definitions and seeks to understand Tongogara as a military leader and how his leadership mimicked revolutionary theory in circumstances where discipline, punishment, and political differences emerged. This is critical to revolution studies because

Tongogara, as we know him in contemporary history, is a creation of hegemonic dominant and heroic Zimbabwean historiography. In familiar texts and literature, Tongogara made an infinite impact as a product of willing scribes who have projected him as one of the most successful and celebrated military veterans of Zimbabwe's struggle yet doing 'epistemic violence' to his victims, who have been castigated as sell-outs and un-revolutionary (Moyo 2017).

Josiah Tongogara's accounts make him a seasoned military revolutionary who is neither a bystander nor a neutral observer but a locomotive in the historic political changes that gave birth to the Zimbabwean nation-state (Doran, 2017). International observers such as the British diplomat Lord Carrington described Tongogara as a 'very powerful military man who moderated ZANU' at Zimbabwe's Lancaster House negotiations in 1979. Within his party, ZANU, the belief by some of the leaders, such as Enos Nkala, was that 'had Tongogara come back alive from Mozambique, Mugabe might not have become first prime minister' because 'he had so much power in the army, a towering commander' (Tendi 2013:838). Tongogara is undoubtedly one of the most revered men in the history of Zimbabwe. Having been influential in setting up the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), ZANU's military wing, he undoubtedly contributed to the self-interpretation of the political question of the day by infusing a military dimension to the liberation struggle after 1973, which led to regional actors to call for a detente. Tongogara is also depicted as a unifier and innovator central to forging a competitive alliance between ZANLA and ZANU, giving rise to the party's protocol, 'politics command the gun'. The protocol emphasised democratic centralism couched in uniformity, discipline, and conformity within ZANU, which the military demonstrated its willingness to accept political leadership (Mangani, 2019). This outcome led to the acceptability of Robert Mugabe's rise to the party's leadership, ZANU, and eventually as the leader of a new Zimbabwe in 1980. These are part of the narratives that have lingered for some time in the narrative of Zimbabwe's nationalist history. As such, Luis White has observed that.

> The traces of that history were everywhere, including in the idealisations of Chitepo and Tongogara. As topics of conversation and press conferences and as ghosts, both men were portrayed as more heroic, more charismatic, and more judicious figures than they had ever

been considered in their lifetimes. Chitepo and Tongogara have been reinvented as men who would have been president of independent Zimbabwe had they lived. The persistence of talk about Chitepo and of talk about visions of Tongogara literally left a trace of the idea of Mugabe's illegitimacy. This is not to say that Mugabe was accused of orchestrating the deaths of Chitepo and Tongogara, although such accusations were not uncommon. Chitepo and Tongogara come back, as it were, to show that the president is unlawfully in his office.

While these narratives illustrate a successful and influential Tongogara, they also depict contradicting narratives. The comeback of Tongogara posthumously serves to revive and repackage the military's unique role in the construction and development of Zimbabwean nationalism. Such a commemoration complex has also ignored toxicity allegations levelled against Tongogara. The views proffered by Tendi (2017), The Sunday Mail (2016), Mazarire (2011), and Chung (2006) belong to the pool of latter-day literature that has sought to deconstruct the already well-known image of Tongogara. Central to their work is a persistent theme of toxicity that runs through in accounting for Tongogara's relations with his subordinates in the military. These military subordinates became victims of 'abyssal thinking' by willing scribes such as Martin, Johnson, and Mugabe (1981), who represented those that disagreed with Tongogara as 'rebels'. The concept of 'abyssal thinking' was coined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos. Abyssal thinking draws a dichotomy between social realities and 'this side of the line' and 'the other side of the line' (cited in Moyo, 2017:116). Santos continues that this dichotomy seeks to ensure that 'the other side of the line' becomes non-existent or is mythical. Tongogara has been depicted as a brave military leader (Doran 2017, Tendi 2013). This falls into the realm of 'this side of the line', and this realm has been celebrated over time. However, an interview conducted by The Sunday Mail with Elias Hondo diverges from this narrative. Hondo says Tongogara was very ruthless with the tendencies of a dictator. He used to admire leaders like Idi Amin and Samora Machel' (The Sunday Mail, 2016:1).

Fay Chung, a Zimbabwean struggle veteran, depicts Tongogara with contradicting qualities. While he was a disciplined military figure, at the same time, he did not brook any criticism (Chung, 2006:127). Like his African contemporaries across the liberation war zones, Tongogara is portrayed with a feudal perception of women as sexual objects to reward men in their war efforts. Allegations of rape at Pungwe III, a ZANLA

military base in Mozambique, were also reinforced by Margaret Dongo, a female ex-combatant. Josephine Nhongo-Simbanegavi has proffered other accounts of Tongogara's sexual abuse of female guerrillas in her doctoral thesis on the role played by Zimbabwean female guerrillas in ZANLA (Nhogo-Simbanegavi, 1997).

Tongogara and the 1973 Review Conference

Tongogara rose to prominence at ZANU's Review Conference in 1973. Tellingly, Tongogara rose to prominence against the backdrop of earlier and visible military successes by ZANLA that he instrumentally used for clientelism and constituency building within ZANU's liberation struggle political hierarchies. As a product of an ultra-conservative ideology, Tongogara arrogated himself as a towering military par excellence commander who was more inclined to the liberation struggle than ZANU's politicians. This narrative found purchase for some reasons. At the time, ZANU claimed to be a genuine Marxist organisation, yet its ideology, form, and content remained ambiguous. An example of this was ZANU's appointment of Noel Mukono to the Secretary of Defence position, yet he did not possess any military background. Such political appointments to critical party positions were depicted as a failure to articulate the political question of the day. Toxicity manifests when leaders utilise methods that have the potential to cause discord within an organisation. Such strategies include the creation of political identities, the naming of individuals, and the establishment of binary distinctions between those perceived to be more militant. At the Review Conference, Tongogara emphasised ZANU's politicians' deficiencies and the significance of the military's agency in confronting the liberation struggle. This underscored the currency of a military approach to the struggle as underpinned by revolutionary theory while concurrently de-legitimising politicians as 'counter-revolutionary, reactionary, divisive, and opportunistic elements'. A dichotomised ingroup and outgroup strategy divided ZANU between politicians on the one hand and military veterans on the other hand. This can be constructed as toxicity in leadership because the narrative by Tongogara sought to inculcate the idea that nationalist politicians had failed to execute Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. More significantly, using watered-down language such as 'counter-revolutionary' subscribed to the idea of a genuine struggle devoid of nationalist politicians' contribution. Tongogara's

approach was intended to view politicians synonymously with counter-revolutionaries. It became common for the rank-and-file soldiers to blame politicians for their lack of a genuine socialist ideology. At this stage, Tongogara was able to manipulate the voting process and was elected to the military's leadership. This should be assessed against Lipman-Blueman's model of toxicity in leadership and Maslow's hierarchy of deficiency and growth needs. First Lipman-Blueman's model of toxicity says toxic leaders tend to manipulate internal organisational structures through vote buying and the use of emotive appeals.

According to Warner (1981), before the Review Conference, whilst Mukono was away on a party business in Romania, Tongogara took the opportunity to visit ZANLA military camps to 'coach people in how to vote'. It is reported that Tongogara bussed about 80 non-party members to the review conference to vote. Second, Maslow's hierarchy of deficiency and growth needs is a template from the discipline of psychology that seeks to explain how Tongogara, regardless of his toxic tendencies, emerged victoriously. Like narratives and political myths that provide meaning to crises, Maslow postulates that needs to give rise to the need for meaning (Aruma & Hanachor, 2017). Contextually, Tongogara's commemorative military complex gave credence to his selfish and narrow actions. At the time, the liberation struggle was void of a charismatic and decisive military figure that would provide direction to the disgruntled subaltern rank and files. At the end of the conference, the Military High Command was primarily under Tongogara's control. The new Military High Command comprised Rex Nhongo, Josiah Tungamirai, and Meyer Urimbo, who accepted Tongogara's legitimacy.

Tongogara, Discipline, and Punishment: The Case of the Nhari-Badza Incident

Patriotic narratives have been at the centre of producing a singular, dominant version of the Nhari-Badza incident. This version proffers heroic and innovative efforts of how Tongogara responded to rising systemic shifts in ZANLA military hierarchies caused by the Nhari-Badza 'mutiny'. In response to the 'mutiny', the political leadership in ZANU chose to brand this group as the 'rebels of 1974' (Mugabe cited in Sadomba, 2011:46). This depiction continued to dominate Zimbabwe's post-independence public and political space. Addressing a press conference in November 2017, Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF)

commander Constantino Chiwenga drew parallels, likening a specific political faction within the ruling party Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to the Nhari-Badza 'mutiny'. Chiwenga caricatured the Nhari-Badza as rebels and counter-revolutionary elements that sought to circumvent Zimbabwe's liberation struggle (Mujere et al., 2017). Consistent with this view are arguments provided by Petter-Bowyer (2003) and Martin and Johnson (1981) that present the 'mutiny' as the work of the Rhodesian Secret Service project to obstruct the liberation struggle. Unbated, the narrative is that as ZANLA provincial commanders in exile, Nhari and Badza began to hold a series of meetings with the Rhodesian Special Branch (Secret Service) to sow division and instability within the military wing. Notably, the roots stem from ideological differences in the armed struggle between the Nhari-Badza group and Tongogara.

To a degree, Zimbabwe's liberation struggle was supported by the Soviet Union and China. There is an emphasis on great power rivalry and how it extended to African guerrilla liberation movements as a critical variable. Suffice it to say that the differences between the Nhari-Badza group and Tongogara reflected Sino-Soviet ideological splits. The Chinese-orientated perception in the Tongogara camp perceived the Nhari-Badza group's preference for Soviet weapons and ammunition over the inferior stock from the Chinese. The implication was that the Nhari-Badza group was now leaning towards the Soviet Union and deviating from the Chinese as ZANU's traditional sponsors. Party enthusiasts such as Tongogara could take advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift as a pretext for manufacturing political identities for the Nhari-Badza group. In the absence of empirical evidence, it is commonplace to tie the Nhari-Badza group to the Soviets or label them as counter-revolutionary. There is also little if no evidence to counter this narrative. This narrative speaks more about the Rhodesian Secret Service's formidable role in destabilising Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. The Secret Service worked hard to preserve white minority rule by curtailing African nationalism in Rhodesia. It is possible that the Nhari-Badza-Soviet Union nexus was intended for this purpose (Tendi, 2017). More significantly, to label this group as the 'rebels of 1974' is simplistic in that it manufactures political identity. Political identity constructs a dichotomised view of politics through ingroup and outgroup strategies. Labelling the Nhari-Badza group as a rebellion was intended to downplay its autonomy from the High Command as a group with particular and genuine concerns.

Chemist Ncube's interview with the Sunday Mail in 2016 is an example of recent literature that seeks to view the Nhari-Badza group within Tongogara's toxic leadership. Ncube opines that the Nhari-Badza 'incident' showed ZANLA's compelling problems rooted in indifference towards pluralism, preferring discipline, unanimity, and conformity. Exclusivism is a consistent thread that runs throughout Ncube's interview. As provincial commanders, Nhari and Badza had written to the ZANLA hierarchy citing persistent challenges in the war effort. Fundamentally, Nhari and Badza identified some of the commanders' excesses in alcohol and women as an impediment to the struggle. This was also compounded by the hunger experienced in the military camps owing to an increase in young people that joined the liberation struggle (Doran, 2017:26; The Sunday Mail, 2016). Of significance was the response of the Military High Command, which demoted Nhari, Badza, and the other commanders from their group to ordinary soldiers. The demotion was a humiliating punishment used to suppress alternative views and not self-correction. In addition, Tendi (2017) opines that responsibility for the 'rebellion' lay with Tongogara's unwillingness to address Nhari-Badza group grievances. Such discrepancies led White (2003:20) to observe that:

> …the [Military] High Command was out of touch and did not visit the [war] front, let alone appreciate the difficulties there…. The high command was riddled with corruption and tribalism. Codes of discipline were violated. Zanu's chief of defence, Josiah Tongogara, had sent a case of whiskey and cigarettes to his relative Josiah Tungamirai.

Since its formation in 1963, ZANU has appropriated itself as a party of the downtrodden and poor. This is shown by its clarion call to war in 1964, which represented an African consciousness posture in the fight against colonialism. In 1973, Tongogara had been elected as ZANU's military leader at the party's review conference and yet, a year later, was accused of violating codes of discipline. By saying this, one is reminded of the false political consciousness advanced by Frederick Engels. In organisations such as political parties, the leadership always insists on moral codes for its subordinates. At the same time, it exempts itself (Eagleton, 1991: 89). ZANLA shares comparable justifications with the African National Congress's (ANC) military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Following its 1967-8 Wankie and Sipolilo campaigns, the ANC

was riven by ideological contestations. Its leadership was accused of lavish lifestyles in exile while simultaneously sacrificing the armed struggle for South Africa. Available literature contends that Chris Hani, an MK operative, wrote a letter to the ANC hierarchy castigating the political leadership's failure to self-interpret the South African political question (Macmillan, 2021). The letter, the *Hani Memorandum,* indicted the ANC's political leadership while contradicting liberation movements' discipline and unanimity doctrines. In response, Joe Modise, one of the leading ANC politicians, recommended having Hani and his military subordinates tried and executed for insubordination. Hani's letter to the leadership was synonymous with sowing seeds of indiscipline.

In response to the crisis in ZANLA, the Nhari-Badza group adopted a 'carrot and stick' approach. While appearing benevolent to the plights of the guerrillas at the war front, they meted violence by killing and kidnapping those who refused to join their cause. Doran (2017:26) argues that Nhari and his co-conspirators seized Dare and High Command members, including civilians like Tongogara's family, in Lusaka, Zambia. It was not the first time Nhari had utilised violence to achieve political ends. In 1973, guerrillas led by Nhari forcefully abducted St Albert Mission School in Zambia, forcing teachers and students to join the war effort. The abductions depicted indiscipline and insubordination within ZANLA and its preference for violence in its relations with the masses (The New York Times, 1973). The symbolic meanings of violence can only explain the decision to kidnap Dare and High Command members. Violence was symbolic in meeting out discipline, resolving political disputes, and as a means to attaining desired political objectives. Such descriptions justify the revolutionary theory claims in its prescription of the political crisis obtained in ZANLA at the time. Violence is consequential in producing myths, perceptions, and narratives as well. Because this was termed a 'rebellion,' this myth became important in influencing the behaviour of the Zambian authorities and the Military High Command. Consequently, the Nhari-Badza 'rebellion' was curtailed by the Zambian police with the help of a ZANLA group known as *Gukurahundi*. In the end, Nhari and 45 of his conspirators were executed under the orders of members of the High Command, which included Tongogara, Nhongo, and Manyika.

Chitepo's Death: An Appraisal of Democratic Centralism

Following ZANU's 1964 inaugural congress call to a revolution, the party sought ways to inculcate a militant approach to the struggle. Subsequently, led by the 'Sikombela Declaration', the party reconstituted itself under the leadership of exiled Herbert Chitepo. Under Chitepo's leadership, the party grew in form and content, establishing the Dare Council, and in 1973, ZANU adopted 'Mwenje 2'. Mwenje 2 was couched in radical Marxist terminology, suggesting ZANU's readiness to self-interpret as a mass-based movement. This was a departure from the traditionalist perception that it was an elitist-inspired party (Mazarire, 2011:574).Drawing upon ideological convergence with Marxism, Mwenje 2 thrust rested on discipline, conformity, and accord with the masses. A chain of command was carried out through what became known as 'politics commands the gun'. Loosely translated, this meant a *political-military enclave* was forged in which the military demonstrated its willingness to be subjected to political authority. The problem with democratic centralism is that it seeks to promote unanimity and not unity. As discussed prior, under democratic centralism, diverging opinions are synonymous with disloyalty to hierarchical politics and the revolution's objectives. This contradicts Marxism's dialectical materialism, which supports the universality of divergence in opinion. It can be seen that democratic centralism can be regarded as a gross misinterpretation of Marxism because unanimity negates plurality in politics and, as such, is synonymous with authoritarianism. More significantly, democratic centralism can be destructive if a group within its hierarchy appears conservative and reactionary (Sithole in Mazarire, 2011).

Drawing from the above observation, the subsection views Chitepo as an embodiment of democratic centralism in ZANU. To expound on this, Chitepo set up the Dare Council, the highest decision-making body in the party. Chitepo's ascendence and setting up the Dare generated much debate within the party and, most significantly, within the military. Military enthusiasts such as Tongogara had always viewed nationalist politicians as 'tea drinkers' because of what was purported to be a lack of commitment to the struggle. As such, the military sought to construct a better narrative of the armed struggle by saying:

> The question Zimbabweans are forced to pose is, to whom the fruits of victory in our war of resistance should belong?... We, ZANLA fighters, are (sic) watered the tree day in and day out and have the most right to gather the fruit... (cited in Moore, 1990).

The observations reveal fundamental splits within the ZANU, pitted between the military and nationalist politicians. More significantly, these contradictions depicted the military's criticism of nationalist politicians' role in the liberation struggle. This persistent exceptionality describes cracks within the so-called democratic centralism sought by Chitepo at this juncture. Between 1974 and 1975, under Tongogara's leadership, the military sought to define its autonomy within ZANU's political hierarchy. To achieve this, the military relied on hard power tools such as meting violence against its opponents, restructuring the High Command, propagating mythical narratives, and a deliberate campaign to undermine Chitepo's political authority (Tendi, 2017). The evidence thus far indicates that the Nhari-Badza incident, discussed previously, was an extension of Tongogara's toxicity and an attempt at undermining Chitepo's political authority (Tendi, 2017). Progressive scholarship studies on the political-military relations in ZANU offer different interpretations of 'the golden phase' promulgated by Chitepo and the toxicity that Tongogara emitted. Mazarire (2011) and Sadomba (2011) point to some of the Chitepo's ability to adopt a vibrant democratic environment in ZANU. Significantly, Chitepo is depicted as forward-looking in his handling of ZANU. This is demonstrated by his ability to sow the seeds of a vibrant democracy. Chitepo is presented as a leader who transcended ethnic affinities by allowing party members to contest for various positions regardless of ethnic background. Such an innovation constructed a nationalist appeal in Chitepo, even among the military, as demonstrated by Elias Hondo in his 2016, where he says:

> Herbert Chitepo was a very quiet person. You know, I interacted with him a lot, but he had unique leadership qualities. Sometimes despite his high rank, he would cook sadza for us. He would use his money to buy food and cook for us (The Sunday Mail, 2016).

Parallels have been drawn describing Chitepo's broad-based and inclusive leadership style, contrasting Tongogara's

> …acutely militaristic behaviour, language, and leadership style…. He was much feared because of his physical size, flagrant militaristic ways, the circulating oral accounts of his ruthless quashing of the Nhari mutiny and the lingering suspicion that he murdered Chitepo (Tendi, 2020:96-97).

Different interpretations of political legitimacy and power reveal that they are dependent on the spread of political myths and ethnic politics. As the struggle for dominance between the military and politicians intensified, the unanimity and discipline of the party receded into the background. Consequently, political rituals emerged, underpinning fractured relations between Chitepo and Tongogara. Political rituals are a symbolic behaviour that is socially standardised and repetitive (Kertzer cited in Tarusarira 2017:15). In his handling of the Nhari-Badza 'rebellion', Tongogara repeatedly accused Chitepo of supporting the 'rebels' because of ethnic affinities. Credence could be given to such accusations, given that Simpson Mutambanengwe and Noel Mukono, both Manyika, as Chitepo, were part of the 'rebellion'. (Chung, 2006). This lack of clear conceptualisation of the military and political question in ZANLA and ZANU at the time polarised the liberation struggle ethnically. It is important to note that this polarisation nurtured the acceptability of destructive forms of punishment, such as the execution of the Nhari-Badza group.

Conclusion

This paper argues that Josiah Tongogara's leadership as head of ZANU's military wing ZANLA, depicted within toxicity in the leadership framework, produced undesirable consequences that threatened to fracture the development of a coherent and solid anti-colonial fight for Zimbabwe's majority rule. To date, Tongogara was a product of minimalist and heroic narratives that celebrated his influence and yet ignored his controversial leadership. While there are debates on whether Tongogara was justified in his instrumentalisation of violence and other asymmetrical means to manage dissent and indiscipline within ZANLA, the undeniable facts are that Tongogara's approach to discipline and punishment gave rise to legitimising violence as a critical variable of Zimbabwean nationalist politics.

References

Aruma, E.O. and Hanachor, M.E., 2017.Abraham Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs and Assessment of Needs in community development.International Journal of Development and Economic Sustainability, 5(7), pp.15-27.

Bakunin, M., 2020.The Revolutionary Catechism (Vol. 10).Pattern Books.

Burns, J.M., 2004. Transforming leadership: A new pursuit of happiness.Grove Press.

Cabral, A., 1972. Identity and Dignity in the national liberation struggle. Africa Today, 19(4), pp.39-47.

Chung, F., 2006.Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.African Books Collective.

Doran, S., 2017. Kingdom, power, glory: Mugabe, ZANU and the quest for supremacy, 1960-1987. Sithatha.

Eagleton, T., 1991.The enemy within.English in Education, 25(3), pp.3-9.

Flower, K., 1987. Serving Secretly: An intelligence chief on record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981. Murray.

Glad, B., 2002. Why tyrants go too far: Malignant narcissism and absolute power. Political Psychology, 23(1), pp.1-2.

Goldman, A. (2006). High Toxicity Leadership Borderline Personality Disorder and the Dysfunctional Organization. Journal of Managerial Psychology, 21, 733-746.

Halliday, F. and Halliday, F., 1999.Revolutions in world politics. Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power, pp.323-338.

Heppell, T., 2011. Toxic leadership: Applying the Lipman-Blumen model to political leadership. Representation, 47(3), pp.241-249.

Huntington, S.P., 2006. Political order in changing societies.Yale University Press.

Johnson, C., 1982. Revolutionary change.Stanford University Press.

Kates, G. ed., 2006. The French Revolution: recent debates and new controversies. Taylor and Francis.

Kellerman, B., 2004. Bad leadership: What it is, how it happens, why it matters. Harvard Business Press.

Lawson, G. 2005. Negotiated Revolutions. Burlington/Hants: Ashgate Publishing.

Lipman-Blumen, J. 2005.The Allure of Toxic Leaders. Why We Follow Destructive Bosses and Corrupt Politicians—and How We Can Survive Them. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Macmillan, H., 2021. Chris Hani. Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Mangani, D.Y., 2019. Changes in the Conception of Nationalism in Zimbabwe: A Comparative Analysis of ZAPU and ZANU Liberation Movements 1977-1990 (Doctoral dissertation).

Martin, D., Johnson, P. and Mugabe, R., 1981. The struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga war London: Faber and Faber.

Mazarire, G. C., 2011. Discipline and Punishment in ZANLA: 1964–1979. Journal of Southern African Studies, 37(3), pp. 571-591.

Moore, D., 1990. The Contradictory Construction of Hegemony in Zimbabwe: Politics, Ideology, And Class In The Formation Of A New African State: York University.

Moyo, G., 2017. The entrapment of Joshua Nkomo within global imperial snares. Joshua Mqabuko Nkomo of Zimbabwe: Politics, Power, and Memory, pp.115-147.

Moran, B. and Salzani, C. eds., 2015.Towards the critique of violence.Bloomsbury Publishing.

Mujere, J., Sagiya, M.E. and Fontein, J., 2017. 'Those who are not known should be known by the country': Patriotic History and the Politics of Recognition in Southern Zimbabwe. Journal of Eastern African Studies, 11(1), pp.86-114.

Nhogo-Simbanegavi, J., 1997. 'Zimbabwean Women in the Liberation Struggle: ZANLA and its Legacy, 1972–1985. Oxford: University of Oxford.

Sadomba, Z. W. 2011. War Veterans in Zimbabwe's Revolution: Challenging Colonialism and Settler and International Capital. Woodbridge: James Currey.

Shubin, V., 2008. The hot 'Cold War': the USSR in Southern Africa. London: Pluto Press.

Stone, A.B., 2013. Growing Up Soviet? The Orphans of Stalin's Revolution and Understanding the Soviet Self (Doctoral dissertation).

Tendi, B. M., 2020. The Army and Politics in Zimbabwe: Mujuru, the Liberation Fighter and Kingmaker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tendi, B.M., 2017. Transnationalism, contingency and loyalty in African liberation armies: the case of ZANU's 1974–1975 Nhari Mutiny. Journal of Southern African Studies, 43(1), pp.143-159.

Tendi, B.M., 2013. Ideology, civilian authority and the Zimbabwean military.Journal of Southern African Studies, 39(4), pp.829-843.

The New York Times, 1973.Rhodesian Rebels Kidnap 278 at Mission. [Online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1973 /07/07/archives/rhodesian-rebels-kidnap-278-at-mission-rhodesian-rebels-kidnap-278.html [Accessed 02 April 2023].

The Sunday Mail, 2016. How Zambia tried to nail Tongogara in Chitepo's death. [Online]

Available at: https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/exclusive-how-zambia-tried-to-nail-tongogara-in-chitepos-death [Accessed 03 February 2023].

The Sunday Mail, 2016.A shocking description of Cde Tongogara. [Online] Available at: https://www.sundaymail.co.zw/a-shocking-description-of-cde-tongogara [Accessed 02 February 2023].

Warner, N. 1981. Times of Darkness: Ethnicity and the Causes of Division within the Rhodesian Guerrilla Groups. Master's Thesis.Australia National University.

White, L., 2003. The assassination of Herbert Chitepo: Texts and politics in Zimbabwe (No. 19873). Indiana University Press; Double Storey Books.