African Journal of Terrorism and Insurgency Research (AJoTIR)
ISSN: 2732-4990(Print) ISSN: 2732-5008(Online)

Indexed by IBSS, EBSCO and SABINET

Volume 5, Number 1, June 2024
Pp 81-120

Sex Outside the City – Vulnerable Masculinities and Toxicity. Rural Perceptions of Masculinity and Manhood in the Light of Extremist Violence in Mali

DOI: https://doi.org/10.31920/2732-5008/2024/v5n1a5

Dominik Emil Dross
Faculty of social sciences
Nord university Bodø, Norway

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between masculinity and violent extremism, drawing on fieldwork in Mali. It investigates the concept of manhood among Dogon and Fulani and analyzes how masculine ideology shapes attitudes and behaviors toward extremist violence. Acknowledging extremism not only leads to people becoming displaced from their traditional occupations and lifestyles but also to changes in gender(ed) roles and "manly" expectations. Challenging traditional practices, it emphasizes a shift to modern expectations, including the importance of financial means and materialistic assets as rites to manhood. The research suggests that joining extremist groups has become an option for vulnerable men to meet masculine expectations, provide protection, and secure coveted positions. These findings underscore the need to consider intersectional masculinity to understand and prevent extremism in Mali and in central Sahel, specifically in rural areas.

Keyword:#*al-Qaeda #Gender #Islamic State #Mali #Masculinity #Sahel #Extremism*

Extremism on the Rise

In recent years, violent extremist attacks have significantly increased in some parts of the world. While violent extremism is not confined to any specific country or region but spreads across national borders, it is highest on the African continent (UNDP 2023). Accounting for more than one-third of all extremism-related deaths worldwide, the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, known as Liptako-Gourma, has become the epicenter of jihadist extremism (SPG 2020; UCDP 2022; IEP 2023). This triangle is one of the few places where Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda affiliated organizations coexist and compete for the same territory and population (Baldaro, Diall 2020). With global extremist franchises in Africa on the rise, and the Sahel region at the heart of these dynamics (illustrated in Figure 1 below) – accounting for 75% of all extremist incidents – the number of attacks has tripled here, resulting in the largest increase in extremist activity worldwide (ACLED 2023a).



Figure 1: Sahel as percentage of terrorism deaths [IEP 2022a:61].

Instability and violence have hit Mali the hardest: Being among the world's poorest countries, Mali made international headlines when a surge of extremist groups took control over significant parts of the country's north (Giraud 2013), which triggered two coups d'état in 2012 and 2021 respectively (Tull 2019; USIP 2021). The country faces numerous issues, including poverty, corruption, and ethnic tensions (Nyirabikali et al. 2014). Already suffering from extremist violence with

persistent attacks on governmental and international installations, Mali's core conflict has degenerated and fragmented along interethnic lines, resulting in conflict and extremist violence between communities. Jockeying for control in the country's sprawling Center, including Mopti Region (Al Jazeera 2022), a great and complex mix of inter- and intra-community tit-for-tat conflicts has developed (Sköns et al. 2016), which the extremists exploit as a recruitment base for their cause.

Mali has slid down the ranks of the Global Terrorism Index (IEP 2022a), Global Peace Index (IEP 2022b), and ACLED's Severity Index Criteria (ACLED 2023b). Although the crisis and the emergence of jihadist extremism in the region have been extensively described by focusing on poverty and grievances, socioeconomic deprivation, and inter- and intra-ethnic strife,[1] discussions still neglect the impact of gender stereotypes – that is, masculinity and manhood – on the crisis in question.

The few studies that exist on the relationship between gender and violent extremism focus predominantly on IS in Iraq and Syria (Eggert 2015; Pearson, Winterbotham 2017; Brown 2018), Boko Haram in Nigeria (Zenn, Pearson 2014; Oriola 2017; Matfess 2017, 2020) or al-Shabaab in East Africa (Badurdeen 2018; ICG 2019). Except Berlingozzi and Raineri's (2023) recent study on jihadi insurgencies, Sahel's IS- and al-Qaeda-linked extremism has been somewhat overlooked, thereby indicating a research gap that this article fills.

The question of how gender(ed) roles and expectations affect young men in Mali to join extremist groups remains not only relevant but also more elusive than ever, given the region's ever-deteriorating security situation. Discussing empirical evidence collected during field research, this article therefore aims to investigate how the perception of masculinity, which is the social construction of what it means to "be a man" (Kimmel, Bridges 2011), plays into violent extremism by looking at local ethnic groups, i.e. the Dogon and Fulani. Comparing both groups is especially interesting since the rich mosaic of ethnicities in Africa brings about diverse cultures, views, traditions, and practices arising from their unique historical, economic, and social contexts (Deng 1997; Rabinowitz 2020).

[1] For more on the background to the crisis in Mali, see also: Lecocq 2013; Gonin, Kotlok, Pérouse de Montclos 2013; Bøås 2015; Ayegba 2015; Sangaré 2016; Bøås, Cissé, Mahamane 2020.

The following sections cover the theoretical framework of violent extremism, including the concepts of gender and masculinity. It explains the data collection methods used in the field. The background to the crisis in Mali is followed by the findings on the perceptions of masculinities of both Dogon and Fulani, their gender(ed) roles, and the tools used to gain and maintain masculinity and manhood. These are analyzed in relation to the impact extremist violence has on such gender(ed) practices.

The article demonstrates that masculine ideology – meaning a combination of patriarchal values and ideals of masculine dominance and toughness – can explain men's violence. Findings also show that the extremists' practices and beliefs resonate with everyday life and gender(ed) roles in rural communities and with deeply rooted social practices that help extremists gain local acceptance. Though determining the causal direction between masculinity and violence is challenging (Bjarnegård et al. 2017), there exist various arguments to explain extremist mobilization as an outcome of gender(ed) roles. This is important, especially given the fact that most individuals involved in extremist groups are young men (Goldstein 2003; Bakker 2006; Groen et al. 2011; Bjarnegård et al. 2015; Burke 2015; UNDP 2016; Kimmel 2018).

How do Masculinity and Manhood affect Violent Extremism?

Definition of Violent Extremism

To investigate the role of masculinity and the social expectations of what it means to be a man in terms of violent extremism, a clear understanding of *violent extremism* is necessary. However, that is like navigating through shallow waters: A standardized definition of violent extremism has not yet been established, despite international declarations, resolutions, and treaties[2]. Arguably, "violent extremism" is predominantly used as a social label in discussions on terrorism and other forms of extreme violence to achieve specific sociopolitical aims (Striegher 2015).

[2] See e.g. https://www.ohchr.org/en/terrorism; https://www.unodc.org/e4j/zh/terrorism/module-2/key-issues/radicalization-violent-extremism.html; https://www.undp.org/publications/preventing-violent-extremism-through-inclusive-development-and-promotion-tolerance-and-respect-diversity

Scholars like Schmid and Hoffman have shed light on the rationale of extremism. Schmid defines extremism as "the holding of extreme views by individuals or groups", considering the complex interactions between individual, social, and political factors. He argues that extremism is a psychological and social phenomenon that could lead to violence (Schmid 2004, 2015). Following this, Hoffman (2018) argues violent extremism involves radical beliefs that justify violence toward achieving ideological, political, or social change. This is not confined to any particular ideology but encompasses a wide spectrum that espouses violence as a means to an end.

Causes of Violent Extremism

People are not born extremists. They do not turn into extremists overnight, nor because of factors like faith, ethnicity, age, sex, or location (ACT nyk). Various aspects, such as individual, societal, and systemic, play a role in radicalization and violence. According to Lia and Skjølberg (2004), deprivation, social distance, sexuality, and intimidation tactics contribute to this. This is employed by many extremists – you either join them or become their victim. So too in Mali: social alienation is deepened by exploiting ethnic differences for extremist causes. Modernization is often cited as a reason for ideological indoctrination, with factors such as rapid economic growth, resource wars, economic inequality, and poverty being highlighted (Lia, Skjølberg 2004). Mali, with its diverse ethnicities, poor resource governance between sedentary and herding populations, and political marginalization, exemplifies these challenges. However, it is impossible to draw a straight course into violence as there exist many causes of radicalization and recruitment (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Horgan 2014; Khalil 2017).

A factor that has received less attention, however, is gender, and even less so the role of masculinity. This is interesting as most extremists are men (Goldstein 2003; Bakker 2007; Groen et al. 2011; Bjarnegård et al. 2015; Burke 2015; UNDP 2016; Kimmel 2018). Discussions are often highly subjective and require a deeper discussion of gender, social norms, and incentives (Goldstein 2003; Higate 2003; Duncanson 2009; Via 2010). This article brings together feminist security studies scholarship on gender and jihadism[3] with the case of Mali. The following sub-

[3] Such as Parashar 2011; Brown 2018; Pearson, Nagarajan 2020.

sections theorize the constructs of gender and masculinity within extremist violence.

Gender as a Complex Relationship of Power

While the literature highlights a tendency to equate "gender" with "women", gender refers to the socially constructed roles, behaviors, expectations, and attributes assigned to both women and men, girls and boys (Gatens 1996; Butler 1999; Sjoberg et al. 2011). Gendered roles – and views on masculinity – are not fixed and vary across religious, ethnic, and historical contexts (Grémont et al. 2004; Myers 2018). Like any other part of society, men are not one cohesive group but play multiple roles.

While most combatants worldwide are men and boys, yet their gender-based attitudes and behaviors are often overlooked, neglecting their masculine identities. (Myrttinen et al. 2017). Gender dynamics predict, serve, and propagate violence, with extremists exploiting them in recruitment (Ndung'u, Shadung 2017). Extremist groups are tied to masculinity in various aspects, including origins, ideologies, recruitment strategies, and their links to political, cultural, and economic structures impact the narratives about how men fit into society. Gendered economic and political factors shape men's involvement in such groups (Roose et al. 2022).

Masculinity and extremism link to societal norms that endorse men's toughness, aggression, and dominance (Connell, Messerschmidt 2005; Duriesmith 2019). Gender roles evolve through lived experiences – practices – (Wilcox 2017) indicating gender is a social construct and power dynamic in oppressive systems (Butler 1998), where certain roles are afforded more opportunities, resources, and influence than others. This holds especially true in traditional patriarchic systems which privilege certain men while marginalizing "the others". Not only is gender a universal marker of how power is experienced (Pearson, Cooks 1995) but a key factor in the stratification of power relations (Jenkins 2000). Gendered stereotypes and identities, like manhood or masculinity, play defining roles in all societies and are thus highly relevant to enabling a deeper understanding of how these roles interact with each other in each particular setting (Jackson et al. 2011).

Masculinities: From Vulnerability to Toxicity

Masculinity is a complex term associated to men's bodies and idealized concepts of how men "should" or naturally "are" like (Duriesmith 2016; Flood 2002), encompassing culturally assigned traits, attitudes, roles, and male-associated behaviors (van Hoven, Hopkins 2009; Hearn 2023). Gender perceptions and stereotypes influence men's lifestyles and behaviors (Stibbe 2004; Leszczynski, Strough 2008; Harland 2009; Khosravi 2009; Batnitzky et al. 2009; Evans et al. 2011). Created, interpreted, and re-enacted during social interaction (Butler 1996), they are not fixed but shaped by different societal norms, producing various masculinities (Levant 2003).

Historically, masculinity research focused on white Western men[4], leading to a gap in understanding extremist masculinities in non-Western regions. Generalizations from the Global North and MENA are problematic as manly ideals vary across history, place, culture, and time (Bairner 1999; Kimmel 2018; Poloni-Staudinger, Ortbals 2014).

In patriarchal societies, manliness means being tough, strong, stoic, and taking on roles like the protector, breadwinner, and decision-maker (Smiler 2004; Connell, Messerschmidt 2005). Connell's (2005) theory of hegemonic masculinity highlights the competition and devaluation of women and dissenting and homosexual men, those who challenge patriarchal gender norms (Levant 2003; Malcher 2009; Lia 2017). Hegemonic masculinity is the dominant and ideal from in a society, an aspiration for most men, achieved by only a few (Connell 2005).

Kimmel (1994) defines masculinity as men asserting manhood through heroic "doings". Masculine engagement therefore includes violent and risk-taking behaviors (Austad 2006; Schmid Mast et al. 2008). Deeply embedded in human society, masculinity is a key factor in perpetrating violence (Tonsing et al. 2011; Kimmel 2013; Beutel et al. 2018). Kimmel (2013) further frames masculinity as rooted in violence and control, with the prevailing problem of "men's investment in masculinity itself" (Wade 2016). Amid globalization and societal changes, young men become ever more confused about what manhood actually means to them (Lottes, Alkula 2011).

The traditional view of masculinity has mixed effects; while providing a sense of identity and purpose through leadership roles, it also pressures young men to conform to societal norms (van Beek et al. 1991;

[4] Such as Kimmel's (2015) self-made man.

Björkdahl, Mannergren Selimovic 2013). Poverty and the intersection of hegemonic masculinities (Morojele, Motsa 2019) intensify men's vulnerability, causing feelings of liminality[5], marginalization, and emasculation and the perception of being a "failed man" (Funk, Werhun 2011; Clowes 2013; Kimmel 2018). This vulnerability (Levell 2020) then creates a masculinity vacuum that transforms into toxic traits like alienation and anger, stemming from insecurity caused by societal and economic changes. Challenging traditional gender roles, this makes men vulnerable to extremist ideologies to regain power and dominance (Haider 2016; Möller-Leimkühler 2017; Brå 2022). Toxic masculinity increases the risk of proofing "maleness" through violence (Barker, Ricardo 2006; Duriesmith 2019), including extremist group membership, hunting for material possessions, economic assets, or women (Barker, Ricardo 2006; Harris 2020). Viewed as "key symbol of masculinity", the image of a hypermasculine warrior (Eicher 2014; Sommers 2019) attracts vulnerable individuals by providing income and peer-based community (SIPRI 2016). This is especially true for young people who lack the symbolic status of adult masculinity, prospects and income are particularly vulnerable[6] to humiliation by society (Hearn 2013). While overlooked in gender studies (Bost et al. 2019), such vulnerable masculinity masks men's insecurities under societal pressure to conform to rigid masculine norms (Levell 2020).

Masculinities and vulnerabilities are rarely considered together, overlooking the intersection of these issues (Sloan 2016). While this typology of males is common in patriarchal societies, it ignores the daily vulnerabilities experienced by those who do not fit the "typical manly" categories.

The concept of masculinity describes male violence through group norms around manliness and manhood (Pearson 2018). However, understanding masculinities is not just about understanding men, but recognizing gendered practices and power structures that subordinate or attract certain groups. Violent extremist groups' construction of masculine norms is crucial in understanding violence (Pearson et al.

[5] According to Vigh (2009), liminality refers to how people act in difficult or uncertain circumstances and describes how they disentangle themselves from confining structures, plot their escape and move towards better positions.
Also see: Saniotis 2005; Gunning, Jackson 2011; Wood 2014.

[6] "Vulnerability" here refers to young and insecure men that have not yet reached manhood and/or lack sufficient socio-economic means to traditional markers of manhood.

2020). The UNDP (2023:74) supports this view, stating that these groups appeal to the "pressure on men to demonstrate their manhood and [the belief] that joining is a social bound up with male identity." As such, extremist groups exploit gender stereotypes and societal expectations of men to recruit.

Framework and Methods

Examining gender(ed) practices while relying on a more comprehensive ontology, an analytical framework on practices can provide an empirical explanation of the social dynamics at play in Mali. Studying practices of masculinity can reveal unexplored patterns of causality inherent in existing predispositions (Pouliot 2010) and highlight rural subjects' agency in conservative Sahelian societies. The framework describes the rules, stakes, and meanings that shape gender(ed) practices and perceptions of masculinity and manhood among Malian Dogon and Fulani. At the same time, a comparison between the two ethnic groups highlights the differences in their perceptions.

Perception is the subjective interpretation of sensory information to make sense of the world, shaped by individual differences, culture, cognition, and past experiences. Different cultures may interpret the same stimulus differently.

The ontology is informed by the broader literature on (jihadi) extremist groups' dynamics and builds on my field research in Mali. In the fall of 2022, I conducted interviews and focus-group discussions (FGD) with Dogon and Fulani near the capital of Bamako for about two and a half weeks.

Most Dogon and Fulani interviewees share the same characteristics of being Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) who have fled Mali's central area. According to the UN, IDPs are "persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes […] as a result of or to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights […], and who have not crossed an internationally recognized border" (OHCHR 2020). While interviewing extremists is difficult, the IDPs from the conflict hotspot of the Center have firsthand exposure to extremist violence and have been close to those who have joined extremist groups. The IDPs therefore offer a rich opportunity to capture their perspectives, attitudes, and behaviors regarding gendered practices related to masculinity and manhood.

Researching the marginalized in conflict settings is complicated due to the difficulties and dangers posed to researchers by violent contexts. These tense social dynamics impact what can be observed and written about, and how interviews are conducted (de Guevara, Bøås 2020). The environment influences how we engage with informants and obtain their consent for interviews (Fuji 2010). Due to high insecurity, independent access is all but impossible in the Sahel, making trusting local brokers crucial (Bøås et al. 2006). Fieldwork-based research in the area has declined due to extremist attacks on hotels and hostages.[7] The little research from the area is often done with trepidation and fear if not paranoia.

Being a white man conducting research in conservative settings with "black subjects" requires positionality, which means being aware of one's conceptual baggage and prejudices (Möllers 2020). Reflecting on the research relationship involves examining how the dynamics of the relationship with the subjects can impact research responses (Hsiung 2008). I strived to access locals' perspectives for an authentic understanding of their social reality (McWilliam et al. 2009). Before departing into the field, I anticipated my research would not be linear (Hermes 1999), but I had to adapt my methods based on the people, conditions, and environment I encountered. Ad hoc data collection happened in various casual, private, and group settings, requiring flexibility and some relinquishing of control.

During this process, to address ethical concerns and limited access, I utilized local contacts and research assistants, commonly employed by foreign researchers (Bøås 2021). Previous collaborations with the assistants fostered mutual respect and an understanding of our unequal power dynamics stemming from the financial resources and opportunities I brought to the table (Eriksson Baaz, Utas 2019). While the terms and conditions were agreed upon beforehand, I still questioned if they made the right decisions and to what extent my presence influenced them, such as taking more risks to advance my research agenda.

Most of the Dogon and Fulani IDP interviewees were chosen during random street-level encounters, through snowball sampling and referral, or in the IDP camps of Faladie, Senou, and Nia Ouro, which are the

[7] This also occurred during my field research, when a German priest was kidnapped just a few hundred meters from me while I conducted interviews for this article. https://apanews.net/mali-german-priest-kidnapped-a-year-ago-released/

main IDP camps of Dogon and Fulani nearby Bamako. Interviews were additionally conducted in the central Region of Mopti solely by a local researcher. Based on open-ended questions guided by a semi-structured interview guide, this resulted in 24 interviews and three FGDs.

Malian Dogon & Fulani Societal Foundations of Conflict

While well known for its diverse natural resources and rich cultural past, about 44% of its population lives below the poverty line (UNDP 2020; World Bank 2021). Key facets of Mali's social demography underpin a skewed political representation as females make up half of the population and about 65% are under the age of 25. However, both social categories have limited public representation, access to power, and human rights, since older men dominate the social and political spheres (Ndaye, Mohamed 2015), which is a source of intergenerational tension, further complicated by mass youth unemployment (SIPRI 2023).

In most African societies, ethnicity plays a significant role in status, hierarchy, habits, and traditions, bringing different views, power structures, traditions, and needs. However, the long-standing coexistence of different ethnicities in the same region has historically caused tensions that were never fully eradicated (Rouch 1953; Gallais 1975; van Dijk, de Bruijn 1995; Baudais 2006; Benjaminsen, Ba 2021). Many conflicts therefore result from "bloodlines", or simply put, ethnicity (Volkan 1997). Ethnicity and culture can be powerful mobilizing forces when horizontal inequalities exist (Stewart 2002), or when one group feels threatened due to (perceived) inequality or marginalization. While Mali's population is about 22 million[8], 1.9 million of them are Dogon and 2.8 million Fulani (OECD 2015); both groups have become the conflict's main ethnic protagonists, populating Mopti Region in Central Mali.

Stemming from centuries-old tradition, the resource tenure systems in Central Mali used to be embedded in societal values, norms, and relations and were closely linked to power structures between different actors (The Broker 2017). The potential of ethnicity to conflict and tension becomes clear when examining Dogon and Fulani history: During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, ethnicity was used for the oppression of the other. Dogon–Fulani areas were dominated by Fulani military power that eventually chased the Dogon away from fruitful farming plains to rocky escarpments (Petit 1998; Brandts 2005).

[8] https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/mali-population/

The Dogon that did not abandon their farms became Fulani slaves or servants (Petit 1998). Only under French colonial rule were the Dogon able to move back to their plains and farms again and its population increased rapidly in the central area (Gallais 1975; Petit 1997). While this brought about a change in power relations (van Beek 2005) back toward the Dogon, the Fulani still feel a sense of superiority, "which seems to keep hampering the Dogon in their dealings with them" (van Beek 2005). The conflict between Dogon farmers and Fulani herders is often framed as a typical farmer-herder issue over grasslands, intensified by climate change and population growth. (The Broker 2017). Indeed, increasing desertification of the Sahel region shrinks access to natural resources, such as water and grasslands (Epule et al. 2018; FAO 2020), leaving little room for adequate living conditions. Although resource scarcity contributes to conflicts, extremist groups exploit community tensions for recruitment, with some claiming ties to Fulani identity. The latter is an assumption spread especially within the Malian army. In fact, Ibrahim and Zapata (2018) argue that some Fulani communities ally with jihadi extremist groups to enjoy protection as well as military training and weapons. This pattern often exacerbates existing tensions as the involvement of extremist groups changes local and regional power dynamics (HRW 2018). Attracted by their anti-corruption, anti-elite, pro-pastoral discourse, fueled by perceived injustice, marginalization, and herders' insecurity, many Fulani, therefore, support jihadi groups (de Bruijn, Both 2017; Jourde et al. 2019; Benjaminsen, Ba 2019). In contrast, the Dogon, led by anti-jihadist and anti-Fulani values, have formed counterinsurgency militias consisting of traditional Dogon hunters (Thomas-Johnson 2019; Africa Center 2020; Benjaminsen, Ba 2021; Lyammouri 2021). With the original aim of defending Dogon communities, they now actively attack Fulani villages.

Although both Dogon and Fulani cultures place a great deal of emphasis on strength and courage, the specific traits and expectations associated with their masculinities differ due to their unique cultural practices and beliefs. While there are differences in the ways Dogon and Fulani masculinities are practiced, expressed, and valued within their respective cultures, the ideals of masculinity and the attendant social expectations, habits, and practices provide a fruitful entry point in the field.

Voices from the Field: Traditional Gender(ed) Norms and Manhood among Dogon & Fulani in Mali

Aiming to grasp the different rules, roles, practices, and meanings that define the gender(ed) perceptions of masculinity and manhood among the Dogon and Fulani IDPs from the country's Center where the ongoing violence is the hottest, this section provides more nuanced interpretations based on qualitative fieldwork.

Dogon Male Practices

From a Dogon point of view, male adolescents become adults through a certain code of conduct: Responsibility, duty, awareness, and wisdom as well as age; these are the moral values that determine adults.[i] Despite the use of violence not being viewed as proof of manhood by many Dogon, masculinities envisioned through traditional athletic competitions can indeed constitute maleness. Physical strength – but not weapons – during festivals and traditional bravery ceremonies can help them appear manly.[ii] Masked dances and other rituals reinforce masculinity and demonstrate bravery and strength including a connection to the spiritual world. These performances are considered a crucial part of Dogon culture and underpin the community's social order. Physical strength and endurance are vital, as Dogon men are expected to be hunters, farmers, and protectors of their families and communities. Nevertheless, there are specific gender roles and expectations for Dogon men and women. While men are typically the main providers for their families and take on leadership roles in their communities, women hold domestic duties. Despite these gender roles, there is still a sense of interdependence and cooperation between the genders, which does not exist for the Fulani in the same way. Dogon men and women complement each other and work together in farming activities; while men provide the physical labor, women manage crops and food production.[iii] [9]

Besides being these faculties, also mental performance determines adulthood: Males can be adults without having yet earned the status of a man. The status of a man depends on the person's "behavior, his way of doing and understanding things […]; it is not a matter of age alone but about one's mindset and character."[iv] Simply put, the difference between a man and an adult lies in the responsibility, wisdom, and awareness that

[9] This view is in line with Lane 1986; Leach 2002; Mehellou 2017.

an adult demonstrates in everything he undertakes.[v] Men can be described as "educated boys" who respect traditional values in a society where the man is the master and the woman is submissive.[vi] A Dogon man is the one responsible for the family, he is the one who gives orders[vii]; this makes "young boys want to be like their respected fathers."[viii]

Especially for the Dogon still settled in their home villages in the central Region of Mopti, the picture of what it means to be a man is still a traditional one and describes bravery and the ability to cultivate. Following both van Beek (1991, 2017) and Richards (2006), local sources stated Dogon men are expected to be stoic and unemotional in the face of adversity and exhibit bravery when facing danger.[ix] Equally important is that a man is honest in everything he undertakes.[x] In their communities, a male role model should respect his commitments and be humble and respectful toward other people, "as respect is mutual"[xi]. To become a Dogon man in the Center, it is necessary to undergo certain initiations such as circumcision, to marry and start a family, and to grow mentally.[xii] Circumcision means status as it grants access to certain areas within a community (the Toguna). At the age of 15, the circumcised male joins the family's decision-makers, and two years later he is given a wife. Someone who is married has higher social status than a single man, which puts pressure on men to get married to be "complete men"[xiii] and thus to be able to hold decision-making positions.

While there exist several meanings of being a Dogon man - "someone physically strong or with spiritual skills"[xiv], including practices of morality and dignity[xv] - Dogon in Mali's Center moreover define a "respected man" as someone who loves his community and fights for the development of his locality.[xvi] One who stands to his given word, and who participates in social institutions such as marriage.

Fulani Male Practices

In contrast, Fulani are diverse as some are farmers and others are pastoralists. The latter is an essential and traditional aspect of Fulani livelihood. Requiring a high degree of physical stamina and resilience, and the ability to navigate difficult terrain, wealth and status are expressed through the skill of herding and protecting cattle from theft and threats.—Traditionally, men are raised, educated, and socialized differently from girls. An FGD reveals that all power – that is, decision-making, economic, customary, and religious power – is firmly in the

hands of men and often involves acts of bravery and heroism, as a man's worth is attached to his ability to provide for and protect his family.[10]

All Fulani men, however, are united through the "same dialect, by being strong and charismatic."[xvii] They are more conservative and rigid than the Dogon: With their culture being more patriarchic, a strong emphasis is put on male dominance. Traditional Fulani aristocracy is translated into the masculine concern that it is a man's pride to take care of his family while giving his wife the freedom to live her life protected from the demands of working. Fulani women are expected to conform to a gender role that prescribes obedience vis-à-vis men, her remaining tasks are therefore the caretaking of their families and the educating of their children.[xviii] All expenses are assumed by the husband, while his wife and children need to be housed, fed, and cared for. A "working" Fulani woman in the fields might do so only out of free will.[xix]

A male Fulani should have "manly behavior"[xx] including the "typical" male physical aspect. From this perspective, a man is someone who has mental faculties and physical strength and provides for his family through cattle breeding.[xxi] Fulani distinguish between two categories of "manliness": based on his "strong physical appearance", or bravery.[xxii] Two locals opine that a man can earn manhood when "people are afraid of you",[xxiii] echoed in another way, this sounds like "men must not be afraid of dying. [….] If you are afraid and cry you are considered a woman."[xxiv] Only far after strength and bravery do Fulani rank "circumcision" as another means to manhood.

Fulani masculinity is greatly associated with strict codes in which men adhere to certain norms and values of strength, courage, discipline, conduct, and morality, followed by a reputation for being stoic and emotionally reserved. According to Last (1967) and Kane (2016), this can result in rigid and inflexible attitudes to social interactions and relationships. The key aspect of masculinity is often expressed through traditional athletic competitions like wrestling or spear-throwing. By importance being placed on honor and respect, men are expected to demonstrate their value through their actions and accomplishments.[xxv]

Though Fulani generally have pacifist and gentle attitudes, using violence to exact revenge for serious wrongs or humiliations, such as arbitrary arrest, rape, kidnapping, or murder, is generally regarded as legal.[xxvi] This attitude to violence might be historically rooted: Kingdoms

[10] For more on men in Fulani culture, also see Gomez 1993; Chalfin 2010; Tounkara 2015.

and empires like Oumarou Samba Dongo or Gueladio Hambodedio had "very brave people", who all "used a lot of violence."[xxvii] Showing weakness is taboo; instead, the obstacles of life may be overcome by "the means available."[xxviii]

According to an FGD, the number of wives and children is a source of social prestige that defines a Fulani's worthiness,[xxix] [11] pressuring men to meet such status by finding women and getting married to build a family. Marriage is essential for maintaining harmony within households, creating social cohesion, and fulfilling a religious obligation. This holds especially for the strict conservative part of Mopti Region, in which Fulani manhood begins with getting married.[xxx] "[A male] must be married to become a man as tradition says, and above all start a family."[xxxi] When single, a male Fulani is not considered a man,[xxxii] but once married, he can take on all responsibilities in the family.[xxxiii] In line with Saul et al. (2020), this is seen as a Fulani's obligation and destiny: Like death, marriage is unavoidable. However, the payment of the dowry, the bride price, may represent a considerable obstacle for many men. There are complaints that while once of symbolic character, the price of a bride has risen dramatically, often exceeding the annual income of a young Fulani from the rural areas.[xxxiv] Therefore, wealthy older men who have the necessary capital often end up taking the most highly prized girls as second or third wives. This leads to frustrations between youths; their inability to marry and have children makes it difficult for them to reach adulthood and eventually foster social acceptance.

Having said that, being a Fulani man implies both physical and mental growth and a change in one's social and marital status. A man "takes care of his family with the sweat of his brow."[xxxv] Despite the responsibility to one's family, in the world of materialists, Fulani men also earn respect through wealth.[xxxvi] Men are expected to be loyal and hold responsibilities over others – this includes bravery and above all hard work.[xxxvii] Acts that hamper a man's dignity, in addition to physical weakness and disabilities, can prevent adolescents from becoming men.[xxxviii]

[11] For more on women and wives in Fulani culture, also see Whitehouse 2018.

Modernity vs. Conservativism – the Impact Extremist Violence has on Gender(ed) Practices to Manhood

Having examined the traditional gender(ed) masculine norms of Dogon and Fulani, this section highlights how these practices of manhood are impacted by extremist violence.

Gender(ed) norms and practices of the Dogon and Fulani who have fled the central area as IDPs to safer regions differ from the ones still in their home villages in the Center: For most IDPs, male characteristics are different nowadays from what they used to be in the past. Male status has developed from being based on traditional attributes to values built on modern societies, such as the importance of financial means. However, Malians who still live in the rural areas of Mopti Region stand in contrast to this change. They continue to value and practice the original traditions of their respective ethnicity.

Based on local IDP sources it became clear that the ongoing extremist violence in the country's central area has affected Malians' lives in all facets. From the loss of family members, possibilities for income generation and education, and division of labor between the genders and within families themselves, to the traditional opportunities to grow and develop from a teenager to eventually assert oneself as a man. Even though fighting and conflict in Mali have turned ordinary men's worlds upside down, this does not relieve men from fulfilling societal expectations and traditions toward them.

> Since the war, many things have changed in our daily lives and our families. Nothing is the same as it used to be.[xxxix]

Means of Occupation, Intercommunal Activities & Schooling

Traditionally being pastoralists, full-time farmers or cattle breeders, IDPs of both ethnic groups told similar stories – when they fled their home villages, they also left behind their traditional occupations and ways of generating income – arable land and access to natural resources necessary for farming and cattle breeding. But what should people do if there is no land available to cultivate?

Only through traditional means of occupation may a male Fulani be seen as a man; "that is the priority number one."[xl] A man without cattle and/or land is therefore devoid of the responsibilities needed to meet societal expectations. As some local Dogon see it: "The war has changed

our living situation by the fact that people no longer practice their income activities such as farming or cattle breeding. Many people flee [and become IDPs] and those who stayed cannot continue to do their daily activities the way they used to."[xli] Before the war Mali was visited by many tourists and people could earn a living easily; now people are forced to look for other jobs as they cannot earn enough money for their families.[xlii]

> The conflict impacts our jobs because there are some places where we no longer can go."[xliii] While life went well in the past and living together and social cohesion were unproblematic,[xliv] personal finances have now dropped considerably as an effect of violence that has slowed down inter-communal activities, such as trading. People used to cultivate a lot and travel to sell and buy wherever they wished, but this has now become a quite complicated undertaking.[xlv] Threats and conflicts between communities has reduced inter-communal trust. "No one knows who is who, who does what; […] a lot of people have fled their villages to bigger cities. The conflict's amalgam has created great desolation between communities.[xlvi]

Another factor within violent extremist governance is the shutdown of schools based on the secular French model and therefore contrary to the extremists' ideology. Although in the outskirts some schools had already closed due to the absence of teachers because of the suspension of their salary, lack of security cut deeply into Mali's children's pattern of life. "First, we [the Fulani children] were going to school, but now there is no more schooling."[xlvii] As schools remain closed, the Fulani children that are still left in the central area of the country traditionally study the Quran instead. The few Quranic schools that exist in the country do not satisfy the local demand for proper children's education[xlviii], or may be sponsored by extremist organizations. This significantly impacts the younger generation preparations for future endeavors and access to the modern job market or universities.

Financial Opportunities & Materiality

Traditional income generation is said to have become difficult. Particularly in the countryside of the Center, young men may approach extremist groups driven by the hope of gaining access to resources such as prestige, income, mobile phones, and motorcycles, which facilitate their access to women, marriage, and therefore adulthood. These young

people see opportunities in the extremist groups' use of "money and influence to convince young people to join them. Once you join [extremist groups] you come back with a new motorcycle."[xlix] A local Dogon stated that some people joined because one of the jihadist leaders – Amadou Koufa – "brought thousands of motorcycles and convinced a lot of young people to join."[l] Today, the majority of young people are in situations of precariousness, lack of opportunities, and rising unemployment.[li] Jihadi extremist groups here represent opportunities one would "not refuse twice,"[lii] as people often fight for their own benefit.[liii]

Rituals & Women's Roles

The villagers cannot even organize rituals such as funerals.[liv] By imposing Sharia law in local communities in the Center, extremists ban celebrations, smoking, and radio, and enforce strict dress codes, the latter particularly on women. Women are oftentimes not allowed to visit public places or to leave the house without their husbands' company.[12] The exclusion of women from farm work not only reflects the practices of "noblewomen" but amounts to a highly prized status in rural societies (IA 2020). This is played on by extremists as a "royal privilege" by creating a perception that local women feel relieved under the Sharia to not have to carry out hard labor. After all, extremism involves specific gendered practices in addition to "life or death" (Rupesinghe, Bøås 2019).

For those who fled from violence and conflict as IDPs, interviews revealed that this has led to a change in gendered family structures: traditionally, women were left to the private sphere. Even though men are still expected to take care of their families by providing food and money to earn a living, now IDP women often leave the IDP camps and look for jobs and possibilities to sell handcrafted goods. With Mali's conflict worsening, typically female "household tasks have not changed"[lv]: While women continue to conduct their "female duties", at the same time many of them also look for sources of income for their families. Although income generation is commonly carried out by men, in times of war and conflict, women often take on male-dominated roles and responsibilities, such as "work" or contributing to the family's

[12] For more on extremist governance, also see Rupesinghe, Diall 2019; Raineri 2020.

breadwinner.[13] Females from the IDP camps of Faladie, Nia Ouro, and Senou outside of Bamako confirmed this picture: While during the day a significant number of them had left the camps looking for alternative income generation, (most of the) IDP men stayed inside, having neither any daily routine nor activity.

Circumcision was not only performed for religious reasons but traditionally symbolized the main rite of passage into manhood. Held publicly, the circumcision ceremony requires a display of courage under the knife to maintain the honor and prestige of the young man's family. Today, however, with the influence of new foreign religions and modernization and the new realities faced by Dogon IDPs near Bamako, this has led to an alteration of the "man-picture": Circumcision has begun to be performed immediately after birth, and is therefore "no longer the most important factor in relation to masculinity."[lvi] Facing new realities as displaced persons and challenged with the loss of their lands and cattle, IDPs point out the need for males to instead grow up, work, get married, and have children in order to become men.[lvii] At the same time, men need to be financially stable to fulfill their needs,[lviii] meaning meeting societal expectations of being providers. This needs to be understood in the context of decreasing poverty, in which marriage strategies have become part of extremist groups' tactics: By reducing the bride price, marriage becomes more affordable for young frustrated single males, easing extremist groups' attempts to establish local roots.[14]

Security

According to local Fulani sources, it is not necessarily the extremists but the Malian army (Forces Armées Maliennes, *FAMa*) that makes the current way of living hard: In most of the rural villages, people would be involved in commerce, but

[13] For more information on women's economic agency in times of conflict, also see: Clingendael 2004; United States Department of State 2012; ICMP 2014; Luna, Van Der Haar, Hilhorst 2017; Yadav 2021.

[14] For more on extremist governance, also see Matfess 2017; Sandor, Campana 2019.

> Since the army arrived, this is not possible to follow anymore. But when the jihadists came, they did not prevent us from doing anything [income-generating activities]. We could do animal breeding. In contrast, the army always takes people and disappears with them. If you are not lucky, your family will never see you again.[lix]

The FAMa is said to especially restrict the Fulani from traveling, which intensifies mistrust and anger with national authorities and can serve as a push factor toward radicalization. When a Fulani buys more than a liter of fuel, "you are more likely to be arrested because the army thinks that you are providing the jihadists with fuel."[lx] Convinced that Fulani support the jihadists, the FAMa subjects the Fulani ethnic group to special harassment. With the start of the conflict, "[…] even though they [army soldiers] come from our community, they arrest you if you are Fulani and they take all your belongings."[lxi] Fulani men find the (alleged) abuses committed by the Malian army and pro-governmental militias on them to be particularly humiliating because they believe they have failed to carry out their protective duties.[15] "In such situations, violence, weapons or physical force help teenagers to become men"[lxii], as a man should know how to defend himself.[lxiii]

While research[16] has stated that in many cases of gender-based violence against women, the perpetrators do not seem to be extremists but rather members of the national army or militias, the demand for protection against the FAMa and militias can be seen as a motivator for local support for violent extremist groups.

> As you know, they [the jihadists] arrived in the country a long time ago and no one joined them. Their number was very low. The government trained traditional hunters who went to attack people with the support of the national army. So, if your parents or friends get killed, you are more inclined to take violent action and then join the jihadists since you do not have any power to go to the court of justice. All the people who were against the army would join the jihadist groups for revenge. That is what increased their number. Moreover, the government considers only one [the Fulani] community to be responsible. So, if you target only Fulani people, the Fulani people would go to the jihadist camps to be safe. Those who are supposed to protect the Fulani are those who kill them. This made many young Fulani join the jihadist groups.[lxiv]

[15] For more on Fulani and FAMa, also see Raineri 2020.
[16] E.g. ISS 2019; Dufka 2020.

Although Sharia law refers to a regime of strict rules that includes harsh and violent punishments, the rule of extremists is not entirely rejected by all local communities. It also grants safety from outside threats – in this case, the Malian army and militias.

Conclusion

Looking at what it means to be male in Mali, this paper has examined local perceptions of manhood and masculinity, and the gendered practices leading to it. The findings were put in the context of extremist violence and societal insecurities.

The relationship between gender, masculinity, and violent extremism cannot be reduced to a simplistic cause-and-effect relationship. The complexity arises from the interplay of various factors such as traditional masculinity, gendered roles, marginalization, extremist groups' recruitment strategies, and the reinforcement of violence. By understanding and addressing these complex intersections, policymakers, researchers, and communities can develop more nuanced Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (PCVE) strategies.

While masculinity is often linked to specific gendered behaviors and roles, it is also intertwined with societal expectations, including materialistic assets, financial means, and the social status of men (Kimmel 2008). Traced back to agrarian societies in which a man's worth is measured by the size of his land and livestock (Ehrenreich 1983), masculinity has historically been associated with the ability to provide and protect, often necessitating the accumulation of financial means and materialistic assets. With the development of societies, the markers of manhood shifted from agricultural productivity to financial wealth, as evident in the Western world (Kimmel 2008). With financial means as one of its markers, unemployment or economic downturn can have a profound impact on a man's self-worth. As the previous sections have shown, this has been confirmed during my fieldwork.

Known for its patriarchal societies, such as in Mali, many men's behavior in the Sahel is shaped by social and cultural norms that support men to hold (almost) every position of power and authority possible, which they are expected to do in terms of their socially constructed masculinity that defines the structures of systemic gender marginalization, discrimination, and neglect of other men and women. When facing masculine grievances, liminality leaves little room for self-

fulfillment beyond the use of violence and membership in like-minded patriarchal groups.

Male IDPs that have fled their communities in the Center of Mali have lost their traditional ways of generating income and are under extreme pressure to assert themselves as "manly enough" in times when customary practices of manhood have vanished. Facing new realities far from their home, their cattle, and their fields, their view of what it means to be a man has changed: From once traditional practices and patriarchal sociocultural norms as rites into manhood (such as circumcision and marriage, being the protector and breadwinner, and a herder or farmer), young males are now tested to fulfill more modern expectations on them. As life continues outside the environment they traditionally used to dominate, men affected by conflict and violence are inspired by modern societies. Based on materialistic assets and status, financial means now play greatly into the markers of manhood and the "masculinity of real men". Not only have traditional practices and patriarchal sociocultural norms become more costly and more challenging to achieve, but assets such as mobile phones and motorcycles have become the more up-to-date symbols of status and masculinity in the Sahel. All of these can easily be obtained from extremist groups. However, it is essential to note that materialistic and financial assets alone neither define masculinity nor lead to radicalization or extremism. Factors such as physical strength, emotional resilience, moral integrity, and intellectual capability all contribute to the construction of masculinity (Connell 2005).

For young males in times of insecurity and disorientation, extremist groups concur with local men's and women's understanding of gender relations and provide opportunities for males to easily meet social expectations and secure coveted positions. As such, it is unsurprising that joining extremist groups has become a tempting option to receive protection against the national army or militias, provide livelihood and income, and facilitate access to the marriage market. The findings from the field have shown that the construction of manhood and masculinity can influence vulnerable young men to either join extremist groups or act violently to be able to live up to "manly" standards.

Masculinity is constructed differently in different settings, localities, and societal groups. To make PCVE policies and programs more effective, these must consider the construction of multiple masculinities for each particular context. Although broadly neglected in discussions about manhood and violence, African masculinity is much more than just a collection of values, norms, and behavioral patterns that express

expectations of how men should behave and present themselves to others. African masculinities are a category of analysis that is highly relevant to consider.

The implications of this research for policy and practice therefore suggest the need for greater attention to the intersectional dimensions of the relationship between masculinity/manhood and violent extremism. A better understanding of the impact of gender(ed) social norms and relations helps enhance the design of regional and national PCVE strategies. To avoid standardized approaches that often reproduce the dominant perspectives of urban settings, the specific needs and aspirations from rural and marginalized areas should be considered.

Notes

If not stated otherwise, "IDP" informants were encountered in the vicinity of Bamako, originally coming from the country's Center. "Local" informants were encountered near their home areas within Mopti Region. Informants were predominantly male, female informants are explicitly highlighted. All encounters conducted as interviews if not stated otherwise, then FGD (Focus Group Discussion).

[i] 36 y/o Dogon IDP_1.

[ii] 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 41 y/o Dogon IDP_1.

[iii] 45 y/o IDP; 36 y/o female Dogon IDP; 40 y/o local female Dogon; 36 y/o local Christian Dogon.

[iv] FGD: four Dogon IDPs aged 22-31; 37 y/o Dogon IDP_1.

[v] 40 y/o Dogon IDP_1; 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_1; 32 y/o Dogon IDP_1; 36 y/o Dogon IDP_1; 50 y/o Dogon IDP_1.

[vi] 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_1; 34 y/o local Dogon_1.

[vii] FGD: five Dogon IDPs (females aged 14, 45, 48, males 30, 50); 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 40 y/o local female Dogon.

[viii] 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_1.

[ix] 32 y/o Dogon IDP_1; 34 y/o local Dogon_2; 40 y/o Dogon IDP_1; 30 y/o local female Christian Dogon.

[x] FGD: four Dogon IDPs aged 22-31; 32 y/o Dogon IDP_1; 36 y/o female Dogon IDP; 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 32 y/o local Dogon_1; 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_2.

[xi] 29 y/o female Dogon IDP; 32 y/o local Dogon_2; 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 32 y/o Dogon IDP_2.

[xii] 40 y/o Dogon IDP_2; 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_2; 50 y/o Dogon IDP_2; 37 y/o Dogon IDP_2; 50 y/o local Dogon; 40 y/o local Dogon; 36 y/o local Dogon_2; 37 y/o local Dogon; FGD: four Dogon IDPs aged 22-31; 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_2; 45 y/o local Dogon_1; 32 y/o local Dogon_2; 50 y/o local Dogon; 40 y/o female Dogon IDP; 40 y/o local Dogon; 29 y/o female Dogon IDP; 25 y/o Dogon IDP; 32 y/o female Dogon IDP; 45 y/o Dogon IDP.

[xiii] 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 41 y/o Dogon IDP_2; 36 y/o female Dogon IDP; FGD: five Dogon IDPs (females aged 14, 45, 48, males 30, 50); 29 y/o Dogon IDP; 25 y/o Dogon IDP; 41 y/o Dogon IDP_1.

[xiv] FGD: four Dogon IDPs aged 22-31; 50 y/o local Dogon; 40 y/o Dogon IDP_3; 25 y/o Dogon IDP; FGD: five Dogon IDPs (females aged 14, males 30, female 45, female 48, male 50); 29 y/o Dogon IDP; 25 y/o Dogon IDP; 32 y/o Dogon IDP_2.

[xv] 36 y/o Dogon IDP_2; 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_2; 36 y/o local Dogon_2; 41 y/o Dogon IDP_2; FGD: four Dogon IDPs aged 22-31; 32 y/o Dogon IDP_2.

[xvi] 36 y/o Christian Dogon IDP; 36 y/o local Dogon_1; 45 y/o Christian Dogon IDP_1; 32 y/o Dogon IDP_1.

[xvii] 28 y/o Fulani IDP; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 25 y/o Dogon IDP; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2.

[xviii] 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 33 y/o Fulani IDP; 45 y/o Fulani IDP_1.

[xix] 40 y/o local female Fulani; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 45 y/o Fulani IDP_1.

[xx] 30 y/o local Fulani_1; 45 y/o Fulani IDP_2.

[xxi] 33 y/o Fulani IDP; 30 y/o local Fulani_2; 50 y/o local Fulani; 32 y/o Fulani IDP; 45 y/o local Fulani_1; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 41 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 30 y/o local Fulani_1; 45 y/o Fulani IDP_3.

[xxii] 30 y/o female Fulani IDP.

[xxiii] 26 y/o Fulani IDP; 40 y/o local female Fulani.

[xxiv] 38 y/o female Fulani IDP; 55 y/o local Fulani.

[xxv] 40 y/o local female Fulani; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 32 y/o Fulani IDP.

[xxvi] 45 y/o Fulani IDP_3; 26 y/o Fulani IDP; 29 y/o Fulani IDP_1.

[xxvii] FGD: four Fulani IDPs (2 women aged 31 and 44, 2 men aged 19 and 40).

[xxviii] 45 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 40 y/o female Fulani IDP.

[xxix] FGD: four Fulani IDPs (2 women aged 31 and 44, 2 men aged 19 and 40).

[xxx] 42 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 41 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 28 y/o Fulani IDP; 31 y/o Fulani IDP; 45 y/o local Fulani_2; FGD: four Fulani IDPs (2 women aged 31 and 44, 2 men aged 19 and 40).

[xxxi] 30 y/o local female Fulani; this view is supported by: 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 32 y/o local female Fulani; 45 y/o local

Fulani_3; FGD: four Fulani IDPs (2 women aged 31 and 44, 2 men aged 19 and 40).

[xxxii] 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 28 y/o Fulani IDP; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 25 y/o Dogon IDP; 45 y/o Fulani IDP_2.

[xxxiii] 41 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 31 y/o Fulani IDP; 40 y/o female Fulani IDP; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 45 y/o local Fulani_1.

[xxxiv] 29 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 33 y/o Fulani IDP; 32 y/o local female Dogon.

[xxxv] 33 y/o Fulani IDP.

[xxxvi] 45 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 41 y/o Fulani_1; 41 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 33 y/o Fulani IDP.

[xxxvii] 45 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 30 y/o local female Fulani; 30 y/o local Fulani_1; 40 y/o female Fulani IDP.

[xxxviii] 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 31 y/o Fulani IDP; 28 y/o Fulani IDP; 45 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 25 y/o Fulani IDP; 30 y/o local Fulani_1.

[xxxix] 40 y/o Dogon IDP_2; 25 y/o Fulani IDP.

[xl] 25 y/o Fulani IDP.

[xli] 44 y/o Dogon IDP; 32 y/o local female Dogon; 36 y/o local Dogon_2; 45 y/o local Dogon_2; 40 y/o Dogon IDP_2.

[xlii] 44 y/o Dogon IDP.

[xliii] 45 y/o local Fulani_2; this view is supported by: 36 y/o female Dogon IDP.

[xliv] 36 y/o Fulani IDP; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2.

[xlv] 44 y/o Dogon IDP; 32 y/o local female Fulani; 29 y/o female Dogon IDP.

[xlvi] 44 y/o Dogon IDP; this view is supported by: 32 y/o Dogon IDP_3; 36 y/o local Christian Dogon.

[xlvii] 25 y/o Fulani IDP; this view is supported by: 42 y/o Fulani IDP.

[xlviii] 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2.

[xlix] 36 y/o female Dogon IDP; FGD: five Dogon IDPs (females aged 14, 45, 48, males 30, 50); 36 y/o local Christian Dogon; 32 y/o local female Fulani; 33 y/o local Fulani; 37 y/o Dogon IDP_2; 45 y/o local Fulani_1; 30 y/o local female Christian Dogon; 37 y/o local Dogon; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_1; 33 y/o Fulani IDP; 40 y/o Dogon IDP_3; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2; 36 y/o local Dogon_2.

[l] 36 y/o female Dogon IDP; this view is supported by: FGD: five Dogon IDPs (females aged 14, 45, 48, males 30, 50).

[li] 36 y/o local Christian Dogon; 42 y/o Fulani IDP_2.

[lii] FGD: five Dogon IDPs (females aged 14, 45, 48, males 30, 50); this view is supported by: 36 y/o Dogon IDP_2.

[liii] 31 y/o local Fulani; 45 y/o local Fulani_3.

[liv] 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 36 y/o female Dogon IDP.

[lv] 29 y/o female Dogon IDP; 32 y/o Dogon IDP_2.

[lvi] 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 29 y/o female Dogon IDP.

[lvii] 29 y/o female Dogon IDP; 40 y/o Dogon IDP_3.

[lviii] FGD: four Dogon IDPs aged 22-31; 25 y/o Fulani IDP.

[lix] 25 y/o Fulani IDP.

[lx] 25 y/o Fulani IDP; this view is supported by: 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1.

[lxi] 41 y/o Fulani IDP_1.

[lxii] 29 y/o Fulani IDP_1; this view is supported by: 62 y/o Dogon IDP; 25 y/o Fulani IDP; 45 y/o local Fulani_2; 29 y/o female Dogon IDP;

FGD: four Fulani IDPs (2 women aged 31 and 44, 2 men aged 19 and 40); FGD with four Dogon IDPs aged 22-31.

[lxiii] 29 y/o female Dogon IDP.

[lxiv] 25 y/o Fulani IDP; this view is supported by: FGD: four Fulani IDPs (2 women aged 31 and 44, 2 men aged 19 and 40).

D. E. Dross is a PhD researcher at Nord University in Bodø, Norway, and affiliated with the Swedish National Defense University. As a military officer including missions to Africa and drawing on insights from feminist theory and critical security studies, his research interest is on gender and insurgencies in the Sahel.

Bibliography

ACLED (2023a): The Sahel: Geopolitical Transition at the Center of an Ever-Worsening Crisis. https://acleddata.com/conflict-watchlist-2023/sahel/

ACLED (2023b): ACLED Conflict Severity Index. https://acleddata.com/conflict-severity-index/

ACT (Action Counters Terrorism) (nyk): What are the causes of extremism? https://actearly.uk/what-are-the-causes-of-extremism/

Africa Center (2020): How Violent Extremist Groups Exploit Intercommunal Conflicts in the Sahel. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/how-violent-extremist-groups-exploit-intercommunal-conflicts-in-the-sahel/

Al Jazeera (2022): Last French troops leave Mali, ending nine-year deployment. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/16/last-french-troops-leave-mali-ending-nine-year-deployment

Austad (2006): Why women live longer than men: Sex differences in longevity. Gender Medicine, 3(2), 79–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1550-8579(06)80198-1

Badurdeen (2018): Women and Recruitment in the al-Shabaab Network. The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs 45(1), 19–48. https://www.jstor.org/stable/45342134

Bairner (1999): Soccer, masculinity, and violence in Northern Ireland: Between hooliganism and terrorism. Men and Masculinities, 1(3), 284–301. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X99001003003

Bakker (2006): Jihadi terrorists in Europe. Clingendael. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/20061200_cscp_csp_bakker.pdf

Baldaro, Diall (2020): The End of the Sahelian Exception: Al-Qaeda and Islamic State Clash in Central Mali. The International Spectator, 55(4), 69–83. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2020.1833566

Barker, Ricardo (2006): Young men and the construction of masculinity in sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for HIV/AIDS, conflict and violence. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/481401468101357773/pdf/327120rev0PAPER0AFR0young0men0WP26.pdf

Batnitzky, McDowell, Dyer (2009): Flexible and strategic masculinities: the working lives and gendered identities of male migrants in London. Journal Of Ethnic Migration Studies, 35(8), 1275–1293. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830903123088

Baudais (2006): L'institutionnalisation de l'état en Afrique: les trajectoires comparées du Mali et du Niger. Université Toulouse I, Institut d'études politiques, Centre Morris Janowitz.

Benjaminsen, Ba (2019): Why do pastoralists in Mali join jihadist groups? A political ecological explanation. The Journal of Peasant Studies 46.1 (2019), 1-20. https://doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2018.1474457

Benjaminsen, Ba (2021): Fulani-Dogon Killings in Mali: Farmer-Herder Conflicts as Insurgency and Counterinsurgency. African Security, 14(1), 4–26. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2021.1925035

Berlingozzi, Raineri (2023): Reiteration or reinvention? Jihadi governance and gender practices in the Sahel. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 25:5, 843-866. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616742.2023.2229860

Beutel, Perez (2018): From WWI to ISIS, Using Shame and Masculinity in Recruitment Narratives. https://www.start.umd.edu/news/wwi-isis-using-shame-and-masculinity-recruitment-narratives

Bjarnegård, Brounéus, Melander (2017): Honor and political violence: Micro-level findings from a survey in Thailand. Journal of Peace Research, 54(6), 748–761. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317711

Bjarnegård, Melander, Bardall, Brounéus, Forsberg, Johansson, Muvumba Sellström, Olsson (2015): Gender, peace, and armed conflict. In: SIPRI Yearbook 2015, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 101–109.

Björkdahl, Mannergren Selimovic (2013): Gendering agency in transitional justice. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010614552547

Bøås (2021): Fixers and Friends: Local and International Researchers. In: Mac Ginty, Brett, Vogel (eds.), The Companion to Peace and Conflict Fieldwork. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-46433-2_27

Bøås, Jennings, Shaw (2006): Dealing with conflicts and emergency situations. Desai, Potter (eds.), Doing Development Research, 70–78. https://www.fafo.no/en/publications/fafo-publications/book-chapters/dealing-with-conflicts-in-emergency-situations

Bost, Bruce, Manning (2019): Introduction - Black Masculinities and the Matter of Vulnerability. The Black Scholar, 49:2, 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1080/00064246.2019.1581970

Brå (2022): Män, maskulinitet och våldsbejakande extremism. https://cve.se/publikationer/manmaskulinitetochvaldsbejakandeextremismenkunskapsoversikt.5.11258e6a184d17a7b2ca1b.html

Brandts (2005): Coping Strategies of Dogon Cultivators of the Northern Escarpment. In: De Bruijn, Van Dijk, Kaag, van Til (eds.), Sahelian Pathways: Climate and Society in Central and South Mali, Report 78/2005. African Studies Centre, 71–94. https://scholarlypublications.universiteitleiden.nl/handle/1887/3018

Brown (2018): Violence and Gender Politics in Forming the Proto-State Islamic State. In: Parashar, Tickner, True (eds.), Revisiting Gendered States: Feminist Imaginings of the State in International Relations, 174–189. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190644031.001.0001

Burke (2015): Paradise jihadis: Maldives sees surge in young Muslims leaving for Syria. The Guardian, 26 February. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/26/paradise-jihadis-maldives-islamic-extremism-syria

Butler (1996): Imitation and Gender Insubordination. In: Garry (ed.), Women, Knowledge and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy, 371–388. https://pcnw.org/files/Butler-ImitationandGenderInsubordination.pdf

Butler (1998): Sex and Gender in Simone de Beauvoir's Second Sex. In: de Beauvoir: A Critical Reader. Fallaize (ed.) https://www.jstor.org/stable/2930225

Butler (1999): Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge. https://lauragonzalez.com/TC/BUTLER_gender_trouble.pdf

Clowes (2013): The limits of discourse: Masculinity as vulnerability. Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity, 27:1 (95), 12–19. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43825636?seq=1

Connell (2005): Masculinities. University of California Press. https://lulfmi.lv/files/2020/Connell_Masculinities.pdf

Connell, Messerschmidt (2005): Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept. Gender & Society, 19(6), 829-859. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243205278639

Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010): Violent Radicalisation in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33, 797-814. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2010.501423

de Bruijn, Both (2017): Youth Between State and Rebel (Dis)Orders: Contesting Legitimacy from Below in Sub-Sahara Africa. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28(4–5), 779–798. https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2017.1322329

de Guevara, Bøås (eds.) (2020): Doing Fieldwork in Areas of International Intervention: A Guide to Research in Violent and Closed Contexts. Bristol University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv12pnsgg

Deng (1997): Ethnicity: An African Predicament. The Brookings Review, 15(3), 28–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/20080749

Duncanson (2009): Forces for Good? Narratives of Military Masculinity in Peacekeeping Operations. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11(1), 63–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616740802567808

Duriesmith (2016): Masculinity and New War: The gendered dynamics of contemporary armed conflict. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315561493

Duriesmith (2019): Chapter 6 Masculinity. In: Shepherd: Handbook on Gender and Violence, 77-88. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788114691.00011

Eggert (2015): Women Fighters in the "Islamic State" and Al-Qaida in Iraq: A Comparative Analysis. Die Friedens-Warte, 90(3/4), 363–380. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24868700

Ehrenreich (1983): The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group.

Eichler (2014): Militarized Masculinities in International Relations. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 21(1), 81–93. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24591032

Epule, Lwasa, Ford (2018): Climate change stressors in the Sahel. GeoJournal 83(6), 1411–1424. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48699942

Eriksson Baaz, Utas (2019): Exploring the Backstage: Methodological and Ethical Issues Surrounding the Role of Research Brokers in Insecure Zones. Civil Wars, 21(2), 157–178. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698249.2019.1656357

Evans, Frank, Oliffe, Gregory (2011): Health, Illness, Men and Masculinities (HIMM): a theoretical framework for understanding men and their health. Journal Of Men's Health, 8(1), 7–15. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jomh.2010.09.227

FAO (2020): The state of food security and nutrition in the world 2020: Transforming food systems for affordable healthy diets. https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en?details=ca9692en

Flood (2002): Between men and masculinities: An assessment of the term masculinity. Peace, Muller (eds.), Manning the next millennium: Studies in masculinities, 203–213. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/103798/

Fuji (2010): Talk of the town: Explaining pathways to participation in violent display. Journal of Peace Research, 54(5), 661-673. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343317714300

Funk, Werhun (2011): "You're Such a Girl!" The psychological drain of the gender-role harassment of men. Sex roles, 65(1-2), 13-22. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192513X20916835

Gallais (1975): Pasteurs et paysans du Gourma: La condition Sahelienne. CNRS. https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k33335016.texteImage

Gatens (1996): Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203418659

Giraud (2013): Cinquante ans de tensions dans la sahélo-saharienne. In: Galy (ed.) La guerre au Mali. Comprendre la crise au Sahel et au Sahara, Enjeux et zones d'ombre. La Découverte. 27–57. https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesafricaines.18237

Goldstein (2003): War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa. Koelner Z.Soziol.u.Soz.Psychol 55, 813 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11577-003-0132-3

Grémont, Marty, Mossa, Hamara Toure (2004): Les liens sociaux au Nord-Mali. Entre fleuve et dunes. Récits et témoignages. Karthala/IRAM.

Groen, Kranenberg, Naborn (2011): Women warriors for Allah: an Islamist network in the Netherlands. University of Pennsylvania Press. https://www.pennpress.org/9780812222333/women-warriors-for-allah/

Haider (2016): The Shooting in Orlando, Terrorism or Toxic Masculinity (or Both?). Men and Masculinities, 19(5), 555-565. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X16664952

Harland (2009): Acting Tough: Young Men, Masculinity and the Development of Practice in Northern Ireland. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Acting-Tough-%3A-Young-Men-%2C-Masculinity-and-the-of-Harland/2e7e5d6d0436854872b640e17b1a0767bfd4b8e4

Harris (2020): Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice. Stanford Law Review, 52(4), 777–807. https://doi.org/10.2307/1229430

Hearn (2013): Studying Men´s violences in Europe. Towards a Research Framework. https://doi.org/10.4471/mcs.2013.22

Hermes (1999): Toward a first nations methodology. In: Parker, Deyhle, Villenas (eds.), Race is ... race isn't. Critical race theory and qualitative studies in education, 83-100. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429503504

Higate (2003): Military masculinities: Identity and the state. Armed Forces & Society, 30(2), 311–313. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48608635

Hoffman (2018): Inside Terrorism. Columbia University Press. https://doi.org/10.7312/hoff17476

Horgan (2014): The Psychology of Terrorism. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315882246

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2018): We Used to Be Brothers, exactions made by vigilante groups in central Mali. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/mali1218_web.pdf

HRW (Human Rights Watch) (2021): Mali Events of 2020. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/mali

Hsiung (2008): Teaching Reflexivity in Qualitative Interviewing. Teaching Sociology, 36(3), 211-226. https://doi.org/10.1177/0092055X0803600302

Ibrahim, Zapata (2018): Regions at Risk. Preventing Mass Atrocities in Mali. Washington D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum & Simon Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Mali_Report_English_FINAL_April_2018.pdf

ICG (International Crisis Group) (2019): Women and al-Shabaab's Insurgency. Africa Briefing 145. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/b145-women-and-al-shabaabs-insurgency

ICG (International Crisis Group) (2020): Mali: A Long Road Ahead for the Transition. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/077-mali-long-road-ahead-transition

IEP (2022a): Global Terrorism Index. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/GTI-2022-web-04112022.pdf

IEP (2022b): Global Peace Index. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/GPI-2023-Web.pdf

IEP (2023): Global Terrorism Index 2023. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-270323.pdf

IA (International Alert) (2020): Dogmatism or Pragmatism? Violent extremism and gender in the central Sahel. https://www.international-alert.org/app/uploads/2021/08/Sahel-Violent-Extremism-Gender-EN-2020.pdf

Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning, Breen-Smyth (2011): Terrorism: A Critical Introduction. BFI Publishing/Palgrave Macmillan. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/publications/terrorism-a-critical-introduction

Jenkins (2000): Introduction to the Special Issue: Defining Gender, Relationships, and Power. Sex Roles 42, 467–493. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007010604246

Jourde, Brossier, Cissé (2019): Prédation et violence au Mali: élites statutaires peules et logiques de domination dans la région de Mopti. Canadian Journal of African Studies/Revue canadienne des études africaines, 53(3), 431-445. https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2019.1666016

Kane (2016): Beyond Timbuktu: An Intellectual History of Muslim West Africa. Harvard University Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvjnrw8k

Khalil (2017): The Three Pathways (3P) Model of Violent Extremism – A Framework to Guide Policymakers to the Right Questions about their Preventive Countermeasures. RUSI Journal, 162 (4), 40-48. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2017.1365463

Khosravi (2009): Displaced masculinity: gender and ethnicity among Iranian men in Sweden. Iranian Studies, 42(4), 591–609. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597584

Kimmel (1994): Masculinity as Homophobia: Fear, Shame and Silence in the Construction of Gender Identity. in Theorizing Masculinities, Brod, Kaufman (eds). Sage Publications. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781452243627

Kimmel (2008): Guyland: The Perilous World Where Boys Become Men. HarperCollins.

Kimmel (2013): Angry white men: American masculinity at the end of an era. Nation Books/Perseus. https://eddierockerz.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/angry-white-men-american-masculinity-at-the-end-of-an-era-pdfdrive-.pdf

Kimmel (2015): Manhood in America. A Cultural History. Oxford University Press.

Kimmel (2018): Healing from Hate: How Young Men Get Into – and Out Of – Violent Extremism. University of California Press. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctv1xxxx4

Kimmel, Bridges (2011): Masculinity. https://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756384-0033

Last (1967): The Sokoto Caliphate. In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. 1971;34(2):446-447. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0041977X00130071

Leszczynski, Strough (2008): The contextual specificity of masculinity and femininity in early adolescence. Social Development, 17(3), 719–736. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00443.x

Levant (2003): A New Psychology of Men. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 27(3), 259–265. https://doi.org/10.1037/0735-7028.27.3.259

Levell (2020): Masculinity, Vulnerability, and Violence. https://doi.org/10.21954/ou.ro.0001154f

Lia (2017): The Jihādī Movement and Rebel Governance: A Reassertion of a Patriarchal Order? Die Welt Des Islams 57, no. 3–4 (2017): 458–79. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26568534

Lia, Skjølberg (2004): Causes of terrorism: an expanded and updated review of the literature. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.3776.6882

Lottes, Alkula (2011): An investigation of sexuality-related attitudinal patterns and characteristics related to those patterns for 32 European countries. Sexuality Research and Social Policy, 8(2), 77–92. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13178-011-0038-1

Lyammouri (2021): Central Mali. Armed community mobilization in crisis. Resolve Network. https://doi.org/10.37805/cbags2021.4

Malcher (2009): Engaging men in health care. Australian Family Physician, 38(3), 92–95. https://www.racgp.org.au/afp /2009/march/engaging-men-in-health-care

Matfess (2017): Women and the War on Boko Haram: Wives, Weapons, Witnesses. African Studies Review. 2019;62(1): E38-E40. https://doi.org/10.1017/asr.2018.98

Matfess (2020): Part and Parcel? Examining Al Shabaab and Boko Haram's Violence Targeting Civilians and Violence Targeting Women. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 43, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1759262

McWilliam, Dooley, McArdle, Tan (2009): Voicing objections. In: Jackson, Mazzei (eds.), Voice in qualitative inquiry: Challenging conventional, interpretive and critical conceptions in qualitative research, 63-76. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203891889

Möller-Leimkühler (2017): Why is terrorism a man's business? CNS Spectrums. 2018;23(2):119-128. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1092852917000438

Möllers (2020): The Possibility of Norms. Oxford Academic. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198827399.001.0001

Morojele, Motsa (2019): Vulnerable masculinities: Implications of gender socialisation in three rural Swazi primary schools. https://journals.co.za/doi/abs/10.4102/sajce.v9i1.580

Myers (2018): Gender and Countering Violent Extremism, Alliance for Peacebuilding. https://www.allianceforpeacebuilding.org/afp-publications/gender-amp-countering-violent-extremism-cve

Myrttinen, Khattab, Naujoks (2017): Re-Thinking Hegemonic Masculinities in Conflict-Affected Contexts. Critical Military Studies 3 (2), 103–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2016.1262658

Ndaye, Mohamed (2015): Société et culture au Mali: Problématiques du changement. International Alert.

Ndung'u, Shadung (2017): Can a gendered approach improve responses to violent extremism? ISS Africa. https://issafrica.org/research/africa-report/can-a-gendered-approach-improve-responses-to-violent-extremism

Nyirabikali, Diarra, Maiga (2014): Causes et manifestation des conflits au Mali: Une perspective de la société civile. CONASCIPAL and SIPRI. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2014/causes-et-manifestations-des-conflits-au-mali-une-perspective-de-la-societe-civile

OECD (2015): The Population of northern Mali. https://www.oecd.org/swac/maps/11-population-North-Mali.pdf

OHCHR (2020): Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons. https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures/sr-internally-displaced-persons/international-standards

Oriola (2017): Unwilling Cocoons: Boko Haram's War against Women. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40 (2), 99–121. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48630968

Parashar (2011): Gender, Jihad, and Jingoism: Women as Perpetrators, Planners, and Patrons of Militancy in Kashmir. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (4), 295–317. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2011.551719

Pearson (2018): Why Men Fight and Women Don't: Masculinity and Extremist Violence. Tony Blair Institute For Global Change. https://institute.global/policy/why-men-fight-and-women-dont-masculinity-and-extremist-violence

Pearson, Cooks (1995): Gender and power. In: Kalbfleisch, Cory (eds.), Gender, Power, and Communication in Human Relationships. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203052792

Pearson, Winterbotham (2017): Women, Gender and Daesh Radicalisation: A Milieu Approach. The RUSI Journal 162 (3), 60–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2017.1353251

Pearson, Winterbotham, Brown (2020): Countering Violent Extremism: Making Gender Matter. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-21962-8

Petit (1997): Société d'origine et logiques migratoires. Les Dogon de Sangha (Mali). Population 52, no. 3 1997, 515–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/1534431

Petit (1998): Migrations et Société Dogon. Migrations et Société Dogon, 1-334.

Poloni-Staudinger, Ortbals (2014): Gendering Abbottabad: Agency and hegemonic masculinity in an age of global terrorism. Gender Issues, 31(1), 34–57. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12147-014-9117-y

Pouliot (2010): International Security in Practice: The Politics of NATO–Russia Diplomacy. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511676185

Rabinowitz (2020): Ethnicity and Power in Sub-Saharan Africa: Do Colonial Institutions Still Matter? Comparative Politics, 52(3), 405–431. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26907862

Richards (2006): What's in a Dogon mask. In: Anthropology and Aesthetics Series, 92-114. https://ualresearchonline.arts.ac.uk/id/eprint/1842/

Roose, Flood, Greig, Alfano, Copland (2022): Masculinity and Violent Extremism. Palgrave Macmillan Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10497-8

Rouch (1953): Contribution à l'Histoire des Songhay. Dakar: Mémoires de l'institut français d'Afrique noire, Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire (IFAN).

Rupesinghe, Bøås (2019): Local Drivers of Violent Extremism in Central Mali. https://www.nupi.no/en/content/download/20508/file/Rapportextremismeanglaisversionfinale.pdf?inLanguage=eng-GB&version=6.

Saul, Diarra, Melnikas, Amin (2020): Voice without Choice? Investigating Adolescent Girls' Agency in Marital Decision-Making in Niger. Progress in Development Studies 20 (4), 270–281. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464993420977801

Schmid (2004): Frameworks for conceptualizing terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(2), 197-221. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550490483134

Schmid (2015): The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2015.1068090

Schmid Mast, Sieverding, Esslen, Graber, Jäncke (2008): Masculinity causes speeding in young men. Accident Analysis and Prevention 2008, 40(2):840–842. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2007.09.028

SIPRI (2016): Open lecture by Conascipal, 9 March 2016, SIPRI, Stockholm 2016.

SIPRI (2023): Listen to Us!: Local Perceptions of Populations in Central Mali. https://www.sipri.org/publications/2023/partner-publications/listen-us-local-perceptions-populations-central-mali

Sjoberg, Cooke, Reiter Neal (2011): Introduction: Women, Gender and Terrorism. In: Sjoberg, Gentry (eds.), Women, Gender, and Terrorism. University of Georgia Press.

Sköns, Nyirabikali, Palmgren (2016): Implementation of the peace agreement in Mali: a complex case of peacebuilding. SIPRI Yearbook 2016. https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2016/05

Sloan (2016): Vulnerable Masculinities. In: Masculinities and the Adult Male Prison Experience. http://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-39915-1_7

Smiler (2004): Thirty Years After the Discovery of Gender: Psychological Concepts and Measures of Masculinity. Sex Roles 50, 15–26. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/B:SERS.0000011069.02279.4c

Sommers (2019): Youth and the Field of Countering Violent Extremism. https://www.cvereferenceguide.org/sites/default/files/resources/Youth%20and%20the%20Field%20of%20Countering%20Violent%20Extremis.pdf

SPG (S&P Global Market Intelligence) (2020): Africa conflict series: Sahel. https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/mi/research-analysis/africa-conflict-series-sahel.html

Stewart (2002): Horizontal Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development. Working Paper Number 81. QEH Working Paper

Series. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08cba40f0b652dd0014fa/wp1.pdf

Stibbe (2004): Health and the social construction of masculinity in men's health magazine. Men Masculinities, 7(1), 31–51. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X03257441

Striegher (2015): Violent-extremism: An examination of a definitional dilemma. https://doi.org/10.4225/75/57a945ddd3352

The Broker (2017): Masters of the land. https://www.thebrokeronline.eu/masters-of-the-land-d40/

Thomas-Johnson (2019): Massacre in Mali: How the 'war on terror' fuels tribal violence in the Sahel. https://www.middleeasteye.net/big-story/massacre-mali-how-war-terror-fuels-tribal-violence-sahel

Tonsing, Lazarus, Ratele, van Niekerk (2011): Masculinity as a key risk and protective factor to male interpersonal violence: An exploratory and critical review. African Safety Promotion Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2011.

Tull (2019): Rebuilding Mali's army: The dissonant relationship between Mali and its international partners. International Affairs 95: 2. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz003

UCDP (2022): Mali. https://ucdp.uu.se/country/432

UNDP (2016): Preventing Violent Extremism Through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance And Respect For Diversity. https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/publications/Discussion%20Paper%20-%20Preventing%20Violent%20Extremism%20by%20Promoting%20Inclusive%20%20Development.pdf

UNDP (2020) Human Development Report 2020. http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr2020.pdf

UNDP (2023): Journey to extremism. https://www.undp.org/africa/publications/journey-extremism-africa-pathways-recruitment-and-disengagement

USIP (United States Institute of Peace) (2021): Mali Conflict. https://www.usip.org/conflict-peacekeeping/mali-conflict

van Beek (2005): The Dogon Heartland: Rural Transformations on the Bandiagara Escarpment. In: Sahelian Pathways: Climate and Society in Central and South Mali, 40-70. Afrika-Studiecentrum. https://hdl.handle.net/1887/3018

van Beek (2017): Boys and masks among the Dogon. In: Ottenberg, Binkley (eds.) Playful Performers: African Children's Masquerades. https://doi.org/10.1353/arw.0.0072

van Beek, Bedaux, Preston Blier, Bouju, Crawford, Douglas, Lane, Meillassoux (1991): Dogon restudied: A field evaluation of the work of Marcel Griaule.

Journal of Anthropological Research, 47(2), 99-133. https://doi.org/10.1086/203932

van Dijk, de Bruijn (1995): Pastoralists, Chiefs and Bureaucrats: A Grazing Scheme in Dryland Central Mali. In: Van Den Breemer, Drijver, Venema (eds.), Local resource management in Africa, 77–95. https://hdl.handle.net/1887/9375

van Hoven, Hopkins (2009): Masculinities. In: International Encyclopedia of Human Geography. Nigel (ed.), Elsevier; 492–496. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044910-4.00970-6

Via (2010): Gender, Militarism and Globalization: Soldiers for Hire and Hegemonic Masculinity. In: Sjoberg, Via (eds.) Gender, War and Militarism: Feminist Perspectives, pp. 42–53. Praeger Security International. https://doi.org/10.5040/9798400655999

Volkan (1997): Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. Farrar, Strauss and Giroux.

Wade (2016): The Hypermasculine Violence of Omar Mateen and Brock Turner. https://newrepublic.com/article/134270/hypermasculine-violence-omar-mateen-brock-turner

Wilcox (2017): Practising Gender, Queering Theory. Review of International Studies 43 (5): 789–808. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210517000183

World Bank (2021): Mali Overview. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/mali/overview

Zenn, Pearson (2014): Women, Gender and the Evolving Tactics of Boko Haram. Journal of Terrorism Research 5 (1). http://doi.org/10.15664/jtr.828